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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to UT AH CODE 
ANN. §78A-3-102. The matter has been assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant 
to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON 
HARRISONS APPEAL 
The Harrisons have misstated certain of the issues presented for review on their 
appeal and the standard of appellate review. A corrected statement of the issues 
presented for review and any correction to the standard of appellate review are as 
follows: 
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether the district court erred in holding that NY A did not breach the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it exercised its contractual right to extend 
va the specific settlement date by the monthly payment of additional earnest money. 
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether the district court erred in holding that the Harrisons breached 
the REPC by refusing NY A's valid tender of payment that only contained conditions that 
NY A had a right to insist upon under the REPC and therefore was unconditional. 
ISSUE NO. 3: No correction. 
ISSUE NO. 4: Whether the district court erred in holding that NY A did not breach the 
REPC as a matter of law because Harrison's breach excused NY A from making 
additional earnest money deposits and closing the purchase of the Property. The court 
reviews the "interpretation of the contract" and the effect of Harrison's breach for 
"correctness." Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, ,I16, 84 P.3d 1134. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON 
CROSS-APPEAL 
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether the district court erred in holding that the REPC required NYA Q 
to make a demand for liquidated damages to be entitled to recover liquidated damages 
from Harrisons. The court reviews a district court's interpretation of a contract and its 
grant of summary judgment for correctness. Green River, 2003 UT 50, ,r16. See also 
Selvig v. Blockbuster Enters., LC, 2011 UT 39, 266 P.3d 691. This issue was preserved 
in NYA's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R290-319), and its Motion for ~ 
Summary Judgment for Damages and Liquidated damages (R728-762) and reply (R802-
852). 
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether the District Court erred in holding that by not making a demand 
for liquidated damages NYA had elected to pursue other remedies available at law, 
namely actual damages. An appellate court reviews a district court's interpretation of a 
contract for correctness and also reviews the district court's grant of summary judgment 
for correctness. Green River, 2003 UT 50, ,r16. The Court reviews whether an election ~ 
of remedies has been made under a correctness standard. Selvig, 2011 UT 39. This issue 
was preserved in NY A's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R290-319), its Motion 
for Summary Judgment for Damages and Liquidated damages (R 728-762) and reply 
(R802-852). 
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ISSUE NO. 3: Whether the District Court erred in holding that NY A had elected the 
remedy of actual damages and was therefore not entitled to pursue nor recover liquidated 
damages from Harrisons. An appellate court reviews a district court's determination as to 
whether an election of remedies has been made under a correctness standard. Selvig, 
2011 UT 39. This issue was preserved in NY A's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
(R290-3 l 9), its Motion for Summary Judgment for Damages and Liquidated damages 
(R728-762) and reply (R802-852). 
ISSUE NO. 4: If NYA is entitled to recover liquidated damages, whether the district 
court erred in failing to award NY A its attorneys fees with respect to the claims for 
liquidated damages. An appellate court reviews a district court's determination whether 
an election of remedies has been made under a correctness standard. Selvig, 2011 UT 39. 
An appellate court reviews a district court's determination of who is the prevailing party 
under an abuse of discretion standard. R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 1 I, 40 P.3d 
1119. This issue was preserved in NYA's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R290-
319), its Motion for Summary Judgment for Damages and Liquidated Damages (R728-
762) Affidavits of Attorneys Fees (R402-4 l l, 414-454, 461-462) and reply (R802-852), 
its Motion to Amend or Augment Attorneys Fee Award (R900-910) and its Motion to 
Amend Order and Judgment as to Attorneys Fees or to Augment Attorneys Fee Award 
(R927-939) and reply (R991-1006). 
ISSUE NO. 5: Whether the district court erred in failing to award NY A certain of its 
attorneys fees including for research. An appellate court reviews the amount of attorneys 
fees awarded by the district court under an abuse of discretion standard. Dale K. Barker 
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Co., PC v. Bushnell, 2010 UT App 189, 237 P.3d 903. This issue was preserved in 
NY A's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R290-319), its Motion for Summary 
Judgment for Damages and Liquidated Damages (R728-762) Affidavits of Attorneys 
Fees (R402-411, 414-454, 461-462) and reply (R802-852), its Motion to Amend or 
Augment Attorneys Fee Award (R900-910) and its Motion to Amend Order and 
Judgment as to Attorneys Fees or to Augment Attorneys Fee Award (R927-939) and 
reply (R991-1006). 
ISSUE NO. 6: Whether the District Court erred in failing to award NYA interest on the 
amount of the Earnest Money Deposits made by NY A from the date of each such 
payment. An appellate court reviews a district court's determination as to the entitlement 
to pre-judgment interest under a correctness standard. Anderson v. Doms, 2003 UT App 
241, 75 P.3d 925. This issue was preserved in NY A's Motion for Summary Judgment for 
Damages and Liquidated Damages (R728-762). 
ISSUE NO. 7: If NYA is entitled to recover liquidated damages, whether the District 
Court erred in failing to award NY A interest on NY A's liquidated damages. An 
appellate court reviews the entitlement to pre-judgment interest under a correctness 
standard. Anderson, 2003 UT App 241. This issue was preserved in NY A's Motion for 
Summary Judgment for Damages and Liquidated Damages (R728-762). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
UTAH CODE ANN. §15-1-1(2) (Interest rate to be 10% per annum where contract does not 
specify rate of interest) (Attached as Exhibit I) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NY A and Harrisons entered into a Real Estate Purchase Contract with addenda 
( collectively "REPC") in November 2006 under the terms of which NY A was purchasing 
the real property of Harrisons with a settlement deadline or closing date1 of October 31, 
2007. The REPC had an initial earnest money deposit of $10,000. It also permitted 
NY A, at its sole discretion, to make monthly $6,250.00 payments of additional earnest 
money in order to extend the settlement date of the REPC on a monthly basis beyond the 
October 31, 2007 settlement date to the end of the next month. NY A paid the initial 
earnest money deposit of $10,000 and beginning in October, 2007 monthly paid 
additional earnest money deposits totalling $137,503.00 in order to extend the settlement 
date on a monthly basis. 
In March, 2009, contrary to the express terms of the REPC, Harrisons unilaterally 
asserted that a reasonable time for NYA to close had already passed, that NYA was in 
breach by failing to close and demanded that NY A close by August 5, 2009 or they 
would exercise their rights under the REPC. Following unsuccessful settlement 
discussions, the instant litigation was commenced by NYA in June, 2009 with a 
counterclaim filed by Harrisons in July, 2009. Consistent with previous months, on 
August 31, 2009, NYA tendered another $6,250 earnest money deposit in order to extend 
the closing date for an additional month. Although NY A had the right to extend the 
closing in its sole discretion by making such monthly payment, because the payment was 
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being tendered beyond Harrisons' demanded August 5, 2009 closing date and because of 
the pending litigation, NY A included a letter of explanation as to its reasons for 
extending. The letter requested an acknowledgement from Harrisons that NY A was 
entitled to extend the closing in accordance with the express terms of the REPC. 
Harrisons rejected NYA's valid tender, returned NYA's earnest money deposit, 
demanded the withdrawal of what were characterized as "inappropriate conditions" and 
asserted that the NY A's actions constituted additional breaches of the REPC. 
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The court granted NY A's 
motion and denied Harrisons' motion, ruling that: 
(a) NYA was not obligated to close within a reasonable time because the 
REPC provided for a specific closing date and for unlimited monthly extensions of the 
specific closing date; 
(b) NY A had not breached the REPC or the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing; 
(c) NY A's tender of the August 2009 earnest money payment was valid tender 
because it only included conditions NYA had a right to insist upon; 
( d) Harrisons breached the REPC by refusing the August 2009 tender of 
additional earnest money deposit; and 
(e) NY A was entitled to its contractual remedies under the REPC against 
Harri sons. 
1 Although October 31, 2007 is referred to in the REPC as the "'Settlement Deadline" and the process as 
"Settlement". "Settlement" and "Deadline" may be referred to herein as "Settlement Date" or "Closing Date" and 
the process as "Closing". 
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NY A filed a subsequent motion for summary judgment for its damages, liquidated 
damages and attorney's fees. NY A was granted judgment for damages for the $147,503 
earnest money deposits which it had paid to Harrisons, interest thereon but only from 
August 31, 2009 and certain of its attorneys fees. The court denied NY A judgment for 
liquidated damages equal to the earnest money deposits as provided in the REPC and 
interest thereon because it incorrectly ruled that NY A had elected to pursue other 
remedies at law namely actual damages. The court also denied certain of NYA's 
attorneys fees including those associated with its liquidated damage claims because it was 
not the prevailing party on the liquidated damages issue. 
Harrisons have appealed the judgement and NY A has cross appealed with respect 
to the denial of its claims for liquidated damages, interest and attorneys fees. 
RESPONSE TO HARRISONS' FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Many of Harrisons' Factual Background are not facts, but are argument. In 
addition, portions of Harrisons' Factual Background states or mischaracterizes the facts 
before the court. NY A responds to certain of such facts below with the paragraph 
numbering conforming to Harrisons' paragraph numbering. Other responses are included 
in NY A's argument. 
19. Two months after litigation commenced, on August 31, 2009, NY A 
purported to make an Extension Payment (the "Disputed Extension Payment"). 
The Disputed Extension Payment was accompanied by a three-page letter from 
NY A's counsel outlining NY A's interpretation of the REPC (the "August 31 
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Letter"). (R.116-18 ( a copy of the Letter from K. Kelly to M. Gaylord et al., 
dated August 31, 2009 ("August 31 Letter") is attached to the addendum as 
Exhibit 8).) It made acceptance of the Disputed Extension Payment contingent on 
the Harrisons' acceptance of NY A's interpretation as set forth in the Amended 
Complaint. (R.116-18; August 31 Letter.) 
NYA's Response: Harrisons mischaracterize the letter which (1) did not 
outline NY A's interpretation of the REPC but rather stated the reasons for the right to 
extend and for the Second Addendum; and (2) instead stated that acceptance of the 
check was acknowledgement of NY A's right to continue to extend the closing in 
accordance with the express terms of the REPC and added no new conditions to 
acceptance of the earnest money deposit payment. 
20. In the August 31 Letter, NY A set forth its understanding of the terms of 
the REPC as follows: 
[Harrisons' quoted portion of the letter is omitted herein.] 
NYA's Response: Harrisons mischaracterize the August 31 Letter which did not 
state NY A's understanding of the REPC but rather stated NY A's understanding of the 
reasons for the right to extend and for the Second Addendum. 
26. On June 14, 2012, the Court issued a Ruling on Cross Motions for 
Summary Judgment ("Ruling"). (R.384-401.) The Harrisons appeal this Ruling 
and related Order, which held among other things, that: 
8 
(a) Because NYA could extend the contract at its discretion, it did 
not deprive the Harrisons of the fruit of the contract when it exercised its 
discretion. (R.387-88.) 
(b) NY A was not required to purchase the Property within a 
reasonable time because the REPC permitted it to exercise its discretion to 
extend closing indefinitely. (R.386-87.) 
( c) The Disputed Extension Payment constituted valid tender because 
the letter accompanying the payment contained only conditions the 
Harrisons had agreed to when they permitted NY A to extend closing at its 
discretion. (R.389-91.) 
NYA's Response: Contrary to Harrisons' mischaracterization of its ruling, 
the trial court ruled that: 
(a) Because the REPC granted NYA the right to extensions according to its 
discretion that to find NY A in breach would be inconsistent with the express terms of 
the REPC and would enforce duties to which the parties didn't agree. (R3 87-8) 
(b) Because the REPC included a specific closing date subject to extensions 
that the court could not impose a reasonable time for closing (R393). The REPC does 
not limit the number of extensions to which NY A is entitled (R392-3, 386-7) 
(c) Because the REPC permitted extensions in NYA's sole discretion, the 
letter setting out the reasons for extending were irrelevant and do not add additional 
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terms to the contract but only contain conditions on which NY A already had the right 
to insist. (R389-390) 
NYA'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On November 10, 2006, NYA, as buyer, and Harrisons, as sellers, entered 
into a Real Estate Purchase Contract for Land and Addendum No. 1 ("REPC") to 
purchase 20.27 acres of real property located in Springville, Utah (the "Property"). 
(R.40-41, ,r 7,8, and 10, REPC and Addendum No. 1 attached as Exhibit 2 .) G 
2. Addendum No. 1 set the settlement deadline to be 180 days from the date 
of the fully executed contract and permitted NY A, in its sole discretion, to choose to pay G 
an additional amount of non refundable earnest money at the rate of $12,500 per month to 
extend the contract monthly beyond the set settlement date. (R.24, Addendum No. 1 ,r,r 3 
andl0) 
3. Less than two weeks later, on November 22, 2006, the parties entered into 
a second addendum modifying the REPC ("Addendum No. 2"). (R.39, ,r15; 
Addendum No. 2 (attached to the addendum as Exhibit 3) Among other things, 
G 
Addendum No. 2, the settlement deadline to October 31, 2007, and reduced the G 
additional earnest money deposits to be paid for monthly extensions of the 
settlement deadline to $6,250 per month. (R.21, Addendum No. 2 ,r 4-5) 
4. In October, 2007 NY A began making additional monthly earnest money 
deposits and continued making such additional monthly earnest money deposits until after 
Harrisons rejected and returned the August 31, 2009 earnest money deposit. (R24 l-242). 
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5. On March 5, 2009, Harrisons notified NYA that "any reasonable time for 
closing has already passed" and that NY A's failure to close was "a breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Harrisons stated that notwithstanding NY A's 
breach that Harrisons were willing to close on or before August 5, 2009, but that if NYA 
did not close, Harrisons reserved their rights and remedies in the REPC. (R.124-125, 
March 5 Letter attached to Addendum as Exhibit 4 ). Contrary to Harrisons' Factual 
Background, the March 5th letter does not invite NY A to propose a reasonable settlement 
deadline. Nor was NY A obligated to close within a reasonable time. ((R. 24, Addendum 
No. 113, 10, R. 21, Addendum No.2 ,r 4-5) 
6. On June 24, 2009, NY A filed an amended complaint against Harrisons for 
rescission, breach of contract, and declaratory judgment. (R.21-41.) On July 27, 2009, 
Harrisons filed their answer and counterclaim for breach of contract and breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in which Harrisons asserted that NYA had 
breached the REPC and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to close 
within a reasonable time. (R.42-5 8.) 
7. NY A continued to make and Harri sons continued to accept NY A's 
additional monthly earnest money deposits through July, 2009. (R.241-242) 
8. On August 31, 2009, NY A tendered an additional monthly earnest 
money deposit (the "Rejected Payment") accompanied by NY A's counsel's letter (the 
11 
"August 31 Letter"). (R. 116-18 (a copy of the August 31, 2009 Letter from K. Kelly 
to M. Gaylord ("August 31 Letter") is attached to the addendum as Exhibit 5 ). 
9. Even though the REPC allowed NY A to extend the settlement date in its 
sole discretion, the August 31 Letter set forth NY A's understanding of the reasons for 
NY A's extension right and the reduction in the monthly earnest money deposits. NY A's 
understanding and reasons were that the purchase price was based on the ability of NY A 
to develop the Property, the availability of the sewer line and storm drainage capacity, 
and the ability to extend the closing date was to allow postponement until it was 
economically feasible to develop the Property and so it could be developed to maximum ~ 
potential. (R. 116-18; August 31 Letter.) 
10. Because Harrisons previously demanded August 5, 2009 closing date had 
passed, the August 31 Letter sought acknowledgement of NY A's continued right to 
extend the closing in accordance with the express terms of the REPC, in its sole 
discretion, by making monthly payments of additional earnest money stating: 
By negotiating this $6,250 check, you are agreeing with my client 
that it is entitled under the REPC to make these payments in order to 
postpone closing in accordance with the express terms of the REPC 
until it is economically feasible to move forward with a residential 
development of the property as discussed above, including in 
paragraphs (a) through (d). My client is simply seeking the benefit of 
its bargain under the REPC, and nothing more - in light of you claims 
that my client may not now close under the REPC. Nothing in this 
letter should be construed as a demand by my clients for any rights or 
benefits other than those provided under the REPC. 
(R.116; August 31 Letter at 3 .) 
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11. The Harrisons rejected the Rejected Payment and returned the check to 
v:J NY A's counsel. (R. 114-15 (September 2, 2009 Letter from J. Boren to K. Kelly, 
("September 2 Letter")) attached to the addendum as Exhibit 6) 
12. Although the REPC permitted NY A to monthly extend the settlement 
deadline in its "sole discretion", Harrisons claimed that NY A was attempting to 
modify the terms of the REPC. Harrisons further stated that the tender of the 
Rejected Payment with the requested acknowledgement from Harrisons of NY A's 
right to extend the settlement date on a monthly basis under the express terms of the 
vJ REPC constituted an inappropriate condition to the tender and an additional breach 
of the REPC and demanded that NY A withdraw what they characterized as "your 
inappropriate conditions." (R.114-15 September 2 Letter). 
13. Because Harrisons improperly rejected the Rejected Payment and breached 
the REPC, NY A did not make any subsequent monthly additional earnest money 
deposits. (R.190, 241) 
14. NY A paid an initial earnest money deposit of $10,000.00 and between 
October, 2007 and July, 2009, had paid additional earnest money deposits of 
$137,503.00. (R.283) 
15. In late 2011 and early 2012, NYA and Harrisons cross-moved for summary 
judgment. (Harrisons' motion for summary judgment (R.110-80. ); NY A's opposition 
(R.192-224 ); and Harrisons' reply (R.229-65). NY A's cross-motion for partial 
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summary judgment (R.290-319.); Harrisons' opposition (R.325-51) and NYA's reply 
(R.352-82)). W 
16. On June 14, 2012, the Court issued a Ruling on Cross Motions for 
Summary Judgment ("2012 Ruling"). (R.384-401) and on December 31, 2012 entered 
an Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment ("2012 Order"). (R.508-510). (2012 
Ruling and 2012 Order Attached to Addendum as Exhibit 7) 
17. On January 22, 2013, Harrisons filed a motion to reconsider the 2012 
Ruling and 2012 Order which was responded to by NYA. 
18. On July 5, 2013, the Court issued a Ruling on Motion to Reconsider ~ 
(R. 700-704) and on October 18, 2013 entered an Order on Harrisons' Motion to 
Reconsider (R. 721-725). (Ruling and Order on Motion to Reconsider attached to 
Addendum as Exhibit 8) 
19. On December 13, 2013, NY A filed a Motion for Summary Judgment for 
Damages and Liquidated Damages (R.728-762) in which NYA sought its contractual 
damages consisting of the return of the $147,503.00 earnest money deposits which it had 
made, liquidated damages in an amount equal to its $147,503.00 earnest money deposits, 
prejudgment interest on the earnest money deposits from the date each payment was 
made, interest on the liquidated damages amount from August 31, 2009 (the date of 
Harrisons' breach) and its costs and attorneys fees. Harrisons' opposition (R766-797), 
and NY A's Reply (R.802-852). 
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20. On May 30, 2014, the Court entered its Ruling on Motion for Partial 
vJ Summary Judgment on Damages (R863-870) (attached to addendum as Exhibit 9). On 
July 1, 2014, the Court entered its Order and Judgment on NYA's Motion for Summary 
Judgment for Damages ("July 2014 Order") (R.921-924 attached to addendum as Exhibit 
10). NY A was awarded the return of its initial and additional earnest money deposits in 
the amount of $147,503.00, interest on the earnest money deposits from August 31, 2009, 
the date of Harrisons' breach, attorneys fees of $59,607.25, and court costs of $360.00. 
NY A was not awarded any liquidated damages. 
21. On July 7, 2014, NYA filed its Motion to Amend Order and Judgment as to 
Attorneys Fees or to Augment Attorneys Fee Award (R.927-939). Harrisons' Opposition 
(R.947-987); and NYA's Reply Memorandum (R.991-1006). 
23. On October 24, 2014, the Court entered its Ruling on Motion to Amend 
Order and Judgment as to Attorneys Fees or to Augment Attorney Fee Award (R1068-
1072). On November 18, 2014 entered its Order and Judgment on NYA's Motion to 
Amend Order and Judgment as to Attorneys Fees or to Augment Attorneys Fee Award 
(R.1080-1082). {The Order and Judgment are attached as Exhibit 11) The Court 
augmented the attorney fee award from $59,607.25 to $67,629.25 and thereby increased 
the total judgment to $286,495.75. 
24. On August 6, 2014, NY A filed a Notice of Cross Appeal (R.l010-1011 ). 
The Notice of Cross Appeal appealed the portion of the July 2014 Order which 
determined that NY A was not entitled to its liquidated damages, failed to grant NY A its 
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attorneys fees with respect to the liquidated damages as well as other attorneys fees that 
were not awarded, and failed to award NY A interest to which it was entitled. 
25. On November 20, 2014, NY A filed a Notice of Amended or Supplemental 
Cross Appeal (R. l 083-1085) which amended or supplemented its earlier cross appeal 
because the Court failed in the November 18, 2014 Order to award NY A certain of its 
additional attorneys fees including those associated with its damages and liquidated 
damages claims. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because the Real Estate Purchase Contract had a specific date for performance 0 
which could be extended at NYA's sole discretion on a monthly basis to subsequent 
specific dates, NY A was not required to close the purchase within a reasonable time 
demanded by the Harrisons. Despite the fact that NY A had the right to extend the 
settlement date on a monthly basis in its sole discretion upon payment of additional 
earnest money, Harrisons claim that NYA's failure to close within a reasonable time '-ii 
constitutes a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. However, the 
implied covenant cannot be read to establish new independent rights to which the parties 
did not agree, cannot create rights and duties inconsistent with the express contractual 
terms cannot compel a party to exercise a right to its own detriment to benefit the other 
party, nor to comport with the court's sense of justice but which is inconsistent with the 
terms of the contract. To hold that NY A was in breach of the covenant for failing to 
close within a reasonable time would be inconsistent with the terms of the REPC and the 
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other principles of the implied covenant. In addition, the agreed purpose for NY A's 
purchase of the property was for development and the justified expectations of the parties 
were that NY A would purchase the property for and when it was able to develop the 
property. Although NYA had sole discretion to extend the closing date for the property, 
the exercise of its discretion to extend the closing until the property could be developed 
was for a purpose reasonably within the contemplation of the parties. There was no 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in NY A's extensions of the 
closing date. 
NY A's tender of the August 31, 2009 Rejected Payment to Harrisons with a letter 
requesting that Harrisons acknowledge that NY A was entitled to continue to extend the 
settlement deadline under the express terms of the Real Estate Purchase Contract did not 
impose any new or additional conditions and was a valid tender. Since NY A was entitled 
to extend the settlement date at its sole discretion, an explanation as to its reasons for the 
exercise of its discretion did not obligate the Harrisons to any new or additional terms 
than those to which they were already obligated under the Real Estate Purchase Contract. 
Harrisons' rejection and return of the Rejected Payment constituted a breach of the 
Real Estate Purchase Contract which excused NY A's further performance under the Real 
Estate Purchase Contract and entitled NY A to its contractual remedies including the 
return of the earnest money deposits it had paid. The REPC did not impose any 
requirement for notification to or demand from Harrisons of liquidated damages under 
the REPC in order to elect to pursue liquidated damages. NYA did not elect to pursue 
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actual damages, but elected to pursue and is entitled to recover liquidated damages from 
Harri sons. 
NYA is entitled to an award of additional attorney's fees for time spent on 
research regardless of whether the items of research are designated because Utah case 
law has not required that level of specificity as to the work performed, is entitled to 
attorney's fees associated with its liquidated damages claims because it is entitled to 
recover such liquidated damages from Harrisons and is entitled to its attorney's fees on 
appeal. 
In accordance with Anderson, Supra, NY A is entitled to pre-judgment interest on 
its earnest money deposits from the date of each payment to Harrisons, not just from the 
date of Harri sons' breach. NY A is also entitled to pre-judgment interest on its liquidated 
damages from the date of Harri sons' breach. The interest rate is 10% per annum as 
provided by UTAH CODE ANN. §15-1-1{2). 
ARGUMENT 
I. NYA DID NOT VIOLATE THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND 
FAIR DEALING WHEN IT EXERCISED ITS EXPRESS CONTRACTUAL 
RIGHTS 
The district court correctly ruled that NY A did not breach the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing in exercising its express right under the REPC to extend the 
settlement date monthly by paying additional earnest money deposits. 
The underlying principle of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 




Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, both parties to a contract 
impliedly promise not to intentionally do anything to injure the other 
party's rights to receive the benefits of the contract. 
Further as stated in US Fid. v. US Sports Specialty, 2012 UT 3, ,r20, 270 P.3d 464 the 
covenant requires the parties "to act consistently with the agreed purpose and the justified 
expectations of the other party." 
"To determine the purpose, intentions and expectations of the parties, we consider 
the contract language and the course of dealings between and conduct of the parties." 
Cook Assocs. v. Utah Sch. & Institutional Trust Lands Admin., 2010 UT App 284, ,r29, 
243 P.3d 888. It is well settled that "[w]here the language within the four comers of the 
contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of 
the contractual language ... " Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 
27, ,25, 207 P.3d 1235. Because courts want to give effect to the parties' intentions as 
expressed in the contract, they should not rewrite the parties' agreement for them. Hidden 
Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 511 P.2d 737, 739 {Utah 1973). "The implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing performs a significant but perilous role in the law of contracts 
... yet the judicial inference of contract terms is also fraught with peril, as its misuse 
threatens 'commercial certainty and breed[s] costly litigation." Young Living Essential 
Oils, LC v. Marin, 2011 UT 64, ,rs, 266 P .3d 814 (Utah 2011) The courts have also stated 
that they will not interpret the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to make a 
better contract for the parties than they made for themselves. Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d 
950, 954 (Utah 1998). In light of these concerns, significant limitations are imposed on 
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the implied covenant. In Markham v. Bradley, 2007 UT App 379, ,Il9, 173 P.3d 865, the 
Court of Appeals described those limitations as follows: 
However, the application of the covenant is limited by some general 
principles: 
First, this covenant cannot be read to establish new, independent rights 
or duties to which the parties did not agree ex ante. Second, this 
covenant cannot create rights and duties inconsistent with express 
contractual terms. Third, this covenant cannot compel a contractual 
party to exercise a contractual right "to its own detriment for the 
purpose of benefitting another party to the contract." Finally, we will 
not use this covenant to achieve an outcome in harmony with the court's 
sense of justice but inconsistent with the express terms of the applicable 
contract. 
Finally, "There is no violation of the duty of good faith, as a matter of law, when a party 
is simply exercising its contractual rights." PDQ Lube Ctr. v. Huber, 949 P.2d 792, 798 
(Utah App. 1997). 
Harrisons asserted that NY A breached the implied covenant because it failed to 
close by a date unilaterally and arbitrarily selected by Harrisons and which they 
characterize as a reasonable time. However, the REPC itself provides that the property 
was being purchased for development. See REPC 1 1.2, Addendum 1, 1 2, 7, and 8, 
and Addendum 2, 1 1. Consistent with intended development, Addendum 1 1 10 also 
provided that NYA had the discretion to pay an additional amount of non-refundable 
earnest money in order to extend the settlement deadline on a monthly basis. 
Addendum I contained no limitation of the number of NY A's extensions. Within two 
weeks of the signing of the REPC and Addendum 1, NY A discovered a problem with 
sewer line availability. NY A informed Harri sons that NY A was not going to be able to 
20 
develop the property as planned and it might be sometime before it could be developed. 
As a result of those discussions, Addendum 2 was executed which extended the 
settlement date to October 31, 2007 and reduced the amount of the additional earnest 
money deposits to be paid for monthly settlement extensions. (See Answers to 
Interrogatories Pages 4-6, 10-12, and 18-22). Again, Addendum 2 had no limitation on 
the number of NY A's extensions of the settlement date. Nor did the parties include a 
back-end or drop dead date by which NY A would have to close. 
Harrisons' assertion that NY A's failure to close by a "reasonable" date violates the 
limitations and restrictions of the implied covenant. Their assertion establishes new 
rights and duties to which the parties had not agreed, namely the obligation for NY A to 
close within a reasonable time and the right of Harrisons to demand such closing. The 
assertion creates rights which are inconsistent with the express contractual terms of the 
REPC, namely NY A's right to monthly extend the settlement date by payment of 
additional earnest money without limitation as to the number of such extensions and 
without a backend or drop dead date. It compels NY A not to exercise its right to extend 
the settlement deadline to NYA's detriment in order to benefit Harrisons. Finally, and 
authoritatively, there can be no violation of the duty of good faith where NY A is 
exercising its express contractual right to extend the closing date. The trial court 
correctly ruled that there was no breach of the implied covenant by NY A. 
The express terms of the REPC, establish NYA's right to extend the 
settlement date. Its contractually permitted extensions of the settlement date were not 
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breaches of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court correctly 
granted NY A's summary judgment motion that it had not breached such covenant. 
Harrisons argue that because NY A had the right to extend the REPC in its sole 
discretion, and that no express standard for its exercise is stated, that the covenant 
imposes an objective standard of reasonableness which the Harrisons argue means that 
NYA was required to close the purchase within a reasonable time. Harrisons' argument 
is not supported by Utah law. 
It is true that Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57, ,I20, 84 P.3d 
1154 stated that: 
The degree to which a party to a contract may invoke the protections of the 
covenant turns on the extent to which the contracting parties have defined 
their expectations and imposed limitations on the exercise of discretion 
through express contract terms. 
But the Markham, supra court in ,r34 described the permitted purposes for exercise of 
discretion as follows: 
The good faith performance doctrine may be said to permit the exercise of 
discretion for any purpose-including ordinary business purposes-
reasonably within the contemplation of the parties. A contract thus would 
be breached by a failure to perform in good faith if a party uses its 
discretion for a reason outside the contemplated range-a reason beyond 
the risks assumed by the party claiming the breach. 
But Harrisons do not invoke the implied duty to refrain NY A from actions that 
will intentionally destroy or injure Harrisons' right to receive the fruits of their contract, 
instead they seek to impose a new covenant on NY A, namely the obligation to close 
within a reasonable time. The courts "have set a high bar for the invocation of a new 
covenant." Young Living, 2011 UT 64, ,IIO and have further stated: 
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. . . the court may recognize a covenant of good faith and fair dealing where it is 
clear from the parties' "course of dealing" or a settled custom or usage of trade 
that the parties undoubtedly would have agreed to the covenant if they had 
considered and addressed it Id. 143. No such covenant may be invoked, however, 
if it would create obligations "inconsistent with express contractual terms" Id. 145. 
... Where the court adopts a covenant enshrined in a settled custom or usage of 
trade, it is simply endorsing a universal standard that the parties would doubtless 
have adopted if they had thought to address it by contract. Where the parties 
themselves have agreed to terms that address the circumstance that gave rise to 
their dispute, by contrast, the court has no business injecting its own sense of what 
amounts to "fair dealing." 
Even the course of dealing and conduct of the parties indisputably show that NYA's 
extensions of the settlement date were consistent with the agreed purpose and justified 
expectations of the parties and therefore cannot be breaches of the implied covenant. 
Harrisons simplify the alleged intent and expectations of the parties to the 
statement that the parties entered into a purchase contract and not an option contract or a 
seller financed purchase and that NY A breached such expectations by not closing within 
the "reasonable" time set, post- execution, by Harrisons. However, from the REPC and 
the communications and conduct of the parties, it is clear that the agreed purpose and 
the justified expectations of the parties were that NY A was purchasing the property for 
development. NY A could extend the closing date in its discretion. There were no 
limitations to the number ofNYA's extensions in either Addendum. There was no back 
end or drop dead date in the REPC. There were no restrictions or limits on the reasons 
for NY A to make any such extensions. Their justified expectation was that NY A would 
not close the purchase until such development was feasible, as it determined. 
The parties conduct and communications also were consistent with there being no 
limitations on the number of extensions and the justified expectation that the purchase 
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would not occur until development was feasible. In the January, 2007 and September 
2007 letters, Mr. Kelly separately informed Harrisons about the development progress 
and informed the Harrisons that he would begin making the monthly payments and make 
them until NYA closed on the property. (See January and September 2007 letters. RI 69-
152). Nothing in either letter limited the number ofNYA's extensions or indicated that 
NY A intended to close before the property could be developed or to close within a 
"reasonable time". Harrisons did not object to either of NY A's letters. 
Harrisons presented no evidence in conjunction with either cross-motion for 
summary judgment disputing that the number of settlement extensions were unlimited. 
Nor that prior to the initial October, 2007 settlement date, it was their intent or 
expectation that closing would occur prior to when the property was developed or within 
a "reasonable" time. Harrisons are presumed to know Utah law and that where a REPC 
provides a specific date for performance, such as closing, that a reasonable time for 
perfonnance cannot be imposed by a court. See discussion below. Harrisons cannot have 
had a justified expectation that the closing would occur within a "reasonable" time. 
Harrisons presented no facts or evidence of a course of dealing between them or of a 
settled custom that shows that parties would undoubtedly have limited the number of 
extensions, that they would have required NY A to close within a reasonable time, or 
included a drop dead date to close. As stated in Young, where the parties themselves 
agreed to the terms of the REPC which specifically address the dispute namely, terms of 
extension of the settlement date, the "court has no business injecting its own sense of 
what amounts to 'fair dealing.'" Young Living, 2011 UT 64, in 0. In contrast, the REPC, 
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NYA's letters and the other evidence are consistent with the parties agreed purpose and 
~ justified expectations, that NY A could and would extend the settlement date until the 
Property could be developed. Consistent with the REPC and his word NY A commenced 
making the monthly payments on October 31, 2007 and continued making accepted 
monthly payments until rejected. 
From the undisputed facts, it is clear that the agreed common purpose and 
justified expectations of the parties were that NY A would purchase the property for 
NYA's development purposes, that NYA could extend the settlement deadline by the 
monthly payment of additional earnest money deposits, that NY A would not close and 
would not be required to close the purchase until NY A could develop the property. There 
was no agreed purpose or justified expectation that NY A's extensions would be limited 
nor that NYA would close within a reasonable time. NY A's exercise of its discretion to 
extend the settlement date until the Property could be developed was within the "ordinary 
business purposes reasonably within the contemplation of the parties." NY A's exercise of 
its discretion to extend the settlement date until the property could be developed was not 
"outside the contemplated range" nor "a reason beyond the risks assumed by" Harrisons. 
Markham, 2007 UT App 379, ,34. 
Ironically, it is Harrisons who breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
when, after accepting NYA's additional earnest money deposits for nearly two years, 
they demanded that NY A close the purchase by their unilaterally and arbitrarily 
designated August 5, 2009 date in direct contravention of the express contractual terms. 
25 
The district court correctly ruled that it was not a violation of the covenant good 
faith and fair dealing for NY A to exercise its discretion to extend the REPC in 
accordance with the express terms of the REPC. There was no violation of the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, as a matter of law, because NY A was simply exercising its 
contractual rights. (R 701, quoting PDQ Lube, 949 P.2d at 798). This Court should 
affirm the district court's ruling and order denying Harri sons' motion and confirming that 
NY A did not breach the covenant of good faith and fair dealing2• 
II. THE REPC SPECIFICALLY STATED THE TIME FOR NYA'S 
PERFORMANCE AND THE COURT CAN NOT IMPLY A REASONABLE 
TIME NOR LIMIT THE NUMBER OF EXTENSIONS 
"(I]f the language within ... the four comers of the contract is unambiguous, the 
parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language," 
Green River, 2003 UT 50, ~17. Furthermore, because courts are to give effect to the 
parties' intentions as expressed in the contract, courts should not rewrite the parties' 
agreement. " [A] contract should be reformed only when its terms are so vague that the 
intention of the parties cannot be ascertained therefrom." Hidden Meadows, 511 P .2d at 
Utah law is clear that "when a contract specifically states the time for its 
performance, it is plain error to allow it to be performed within a reasonable time. A court 
(~\ 
\iij;,I 
may allow a contract to be perfonned within a reasonable time only when the contract is ~ 
silent as to the time for its performance." Watson v. Hatch, 728 P.2d 989, 990 (Utah 
2 If the court were to determine that there may be a breach of such covenant despite NY A 
merely exercising its contractual rights, then there are disputed issues of fact which 
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1986). Coulter & Smith, 966 P.2d at 858. In contracts where time is of the essence "the 
stipulation of the contract must be exactly complied with." Roberts v. Braffett, 92 P. 789, 
793 (Utah 1907). It is only "where a contract or conveyance expresses no time for the 
performance of an act contemplated by such contract or conveyance, a reasonable time is 
implied." Salt Lake City v. State, 125 P .2d 790, 793 (Utah 1942) ( emphasis added). 
The REPC and addenda explicitly provide the specific time for settlement namely 
October 31, 2007. NYA had the option to pay additional earnest money to extend such 
specific settlement date. IfNYA paid additional earnest money, settlement was extended 
for one month to the end of the next calendar month. Settlement would be extended to 
the end of each successive month as additional earnest money deposits were made by 
NY A. At all times, the REPC stated a specific time for NY A's performance. There is no 
ambiguity regarding the settlement date or its extension to another specific settlement 
date. Accordingly, neither Harrisons nor the court can imply a reasonable time for 
NYA's performance. There is no ambiguity that the REPC provided for an unlimited 
number ofNYA's extensions. The court cannot reform the REPC to limit the number of 
NYA's extensions. 
Harrisons assert that NY A's right to extend the specific settlement date by making 
monthly payments does not make the time for performance definite or specific and that 
the court should have imposed a reasonable time for performance. Harrisons have cited 
no cases that the ability of a party to extend, or repeatedly extend the time of 
perfonnance, in particular the closing date, to another specific date means that the 
would preclude the court from granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
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contract has no specific time for performance or that a reasonable time for performance 
may be imposed. NY A is unaware of any such case. 
The court is referred to Hidden Meadows. supra. which involved an option 
agreement that provided: "This contract is automatically renewed from year to year 
unless notice of cancellation is given by either party prior to October I of any year." The 
court interpreted the contract to mean that if no notice of termination was given by 
October I, 1970, it would be extended for the following year, and so on. There were no Q 
limitations in the agreement as to how many times the option could be extended. The 
Court held that "in the contract under consideration in this matter we think the language 
is clear, certain, definite, and unambiguous. As the judge said, there is no need for 
reformation." Id. at 739. Even though the option agreement continued year by year, the 
Hidden Meadows court did not impose a requirement that closing occur within a 
reasonable time, nor limit the number of extensions. 
Because the REPC clearly and unambiguously set a specific date for settlement 
and for monthly extensions of such date to subsequent specific dates for performance, 
neither Harrisons nor the Court may impose a reasonable date for NY A's closing of the 
purchase. This Court should affirm the district court's ruling denying the Harrisons' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and hold that Harrisons could not impose a reasonable 
time for closing. 
Even if the court could impose a reasonable time for closing, Utah law is that the 
determination of what is a reasonable time is a question of fact that could not be decided 
by the trial court on summary judgment nor by this court on appeal. "[W]hat is 
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reasonable is a question of fact." Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 860 {Utah 1979). 
"[W]hat is a reasonable time under the circumstances ... is a factual determination" 
Coulter & Smith, 966 P .2d at 858. It is only "if the facts are undisputed, the question is 
one of law for the court. If the facts are in dispute and the question rests on inference, it is 
one of fact." Salt Lake City, 125 P .2d at 793. 
Harrisons assert that IHC Health Servs. v. D&K Mgmt., 2008 UT 73 {Utah 2008) 
allows the court to determine a reasonable time as a matter of law. However, IHC did not 
involve a reasonable time, but a waiver and even then the court applied the summary 
judgment standard to only permit such determination if the facts were undisputed. 
Harrisons also cite to Contimortgage Corp. v. Mortgage Am., Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 575, 
578 (E.D. Pa. 1999) that the court may decide what is a reasonable time as a matter of 
law. Such case has no precedential value in Utah since it is a Pennsylvania federal 
district court. More importantly, the case does not stand for the Harrisons' assertion. The 
Contimortgage court stated it could only make determination of a reasonable time for 
performance as a matter of law in a recurring commercial transaction that happened in the 
same way and with the same data day after day. Id The instant case does not involve 
such recurring circumstance. 
Harrisons argue that a reasonable time for NY A's performance had and that NY A 
breached by failure to close by August 5, 2009 which they asserted was a reasonable time 
as a matter of law. In their brief Harrisons now identify five "undisputed" facts that they 
assert enable the court as a matter of law to determine NY A's breach for failure to close b 
August 5, 2009. NYA has disputed that Harrisons' arbitrarily designated August 5, 2009 
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closing date was a reasonable time to close and that NYA was in breach in failing to so 
close in their response to Harrisons' Motion for Summary Judgment. The court is 
referred to such response for more detail as to its dispute of Harrisons' facts. (R212-224, 
202-207) 
It is clear from the five facts cited by Harrisons in their brief that the court cannot 
decide as a matter of law what a reasonable time for closing is or that NY A breached by 
failing to close by August 5, 2009: (1) The parties agreed to an October 31, 2007 closing W 
date and an unlimited number of NY A's extensions. Such specific dates, do not mean 
August 5, 2009 was a reasonable date but preclude Harrisons from imposing a reasonable 
time to close: (2) NYA's letter indicating that closing shouldn't be too far in the future. 
Such letter and statement were not incorporated into the REPC and do not modify it: (3) 
NY A did not terminate the REPC during the due diligence period. This fact is irrelevant 
since the REPC provided the ability to extend closing to accommodate the sewer 
installation. ( 4) Harri sons notified NY A in March, 2009 that they would have to close by 
August 5, 2009 which Harrisons assert gave NYA a reasonable time to pull financing 
together and to close. Harrisons raise for the first time, without any factual support, that 
the 5 months was sufficient to secure financing. It is also irrelevant since the purchase 
was dependent on development of the property, not financing. (5) time is of the essence 
of the REPC. This fact is irrelevant because of the extension right. From such limited ~ 
facts, the court could not determine a reasonable time for performance based on the 
totality of the circumstances. Moreover, none of such provisions address in any way 
NYA's clearly manifested intent to purchase the property for development and the 
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identified issues and difficulties of such development which would affect the 
reasonableness of any closing date. 
Even if the Court were to determine that a reasonable time for performance could 
be imposed on NY A, disputed issues of fact precluded the trial court and this court from 
determining as a matter of law that August 5, 2009 was a reasonable time for NY A's 
performance or that NY A breached by failing to close by such date. The court should 
deny that Harrisons' appeal that NY A was required to close within a reasonable time. 
III. THE AUGUST 2009 EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT WAS VALIDLY 
TENDERED 
The district court correctly ruled that the tender of the August 2009 earnest money 
deposit was unconditional because it contained only conditions upon which NY A already 
had a right to insist. "A tender, to be good, must be free from any condition which the 
tenderer does not have a right to insist upon." Sieverts v. White, 273 P.2d 974 (Utah 
1954 ). "The tender cannot impose on the other party a new condition or requirement not 
already imposed by the contract.. .. A party to a bilateral contract may, however, properly 
condition a tender on the other's performance, since such a condition does not impose a 
requirement beyond that already contained in the contract." Kelley v. Leucadia Fin. 
Corp., 846 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1992). The focus is whether the tender demands 
"new" or "additional" obligations or merely demands performance of what the other 
party was already required to do. 
When NY A tendered the Rejected Payment, it merely demanded perfonnance 
already required of Harrisons under the REPC. The August 31 Letter sought 
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acknowledgement from Harrisons of NY A's continued right to extend the closing in 
accordance with the express terms of the REPC by making monthly payments of 
additional earnest money. Harrisons would then fulfill their obligations under the REPC 
by accepting NY A's earnest money deposits and extending the closing. Requesting 
acknowledgment from Harrisons that they would continue to comply with the REPC 
cannot be deemed an additional or new condition that would render NY A's tender 
conditional or invalid. The August 31 Letter specifically stated "Nothing in this letter W 
should be construed as a demand by my clients for any rights or benefits other than 
those provided under the REPC." This statement made it abundantly clear that NY A 
was not imposing any new or additional conditions. It was reasonable for NY A to seek 
such confirmation after the Harrisons claimed NY A was in breach of the REPC, and 
demanded that NYA close by August 5, 2009. 
Harrisons assert that NY A's tender was invalid and imposed additional conditions 
because the REPC was silent as to the economic feasibility of development of the 
property, the availability of the sewer line and storm drain capacity but the Letter 
included terms not expressly stated in the REPC. Harrisons' assertion is hypertechnical 
and their focus wrong. The correct analysis is not whether the words of the tender letter 
were included in the REPC but whether the tender imposed additional obligations on 
Harrisons. It did not. The REPC permitted NY A to extend the settlement date in its sole w 
discretion upon payment of the agreed additional earnest money deposit with no 
restriction as to the reason. Because NYA could extend the settlement in its discretion by 
making payment, it was unnecessary to specify the reasons or basis for the extension and 
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could extend without a stated reason. If the agreed additional earnest money deposit was 
timely paid, Harrisons were obligated to accept it and extend the settlement date for one 
month. Since the REPC granted NY A an unlimited number of extensions and did not 
restrict the reasons for extension, the letter did not impose any new or additional 
obligation or condition by requesting acknowledgement of NYA's continued right to 
extend until it was economically feasible to the develop the property, consistent with 
sewer line availability and storm drain capacity. Harrisons incorrectly argue that 
acceptance would have waived their claims for a reasonable time to close or breach of the 
implied covenant. But in reality Harrisons had no such claims anyway. NYA's seeking 
of confirmation of its right to extend until such development circumstances occurred was 
actually consistent with the agreed purpose and justified expectations of the parties. 
Harrisons argue that because NY A included an explanation its actions in extending the 
contract pursuant to the express terms of the contract, NY A's tender is invalid. Under 
Harrisons' analysis, had NY A simply sent a one line letter extending the settlement date 
with a check it would have been acceptable tender, but in explaining its thinking for 
making the election to extend, NY A rendered the tender conditional and invalid. The 
illogic of Harrisons' position is clear. NYA's tender did not impose any new or 
additional conditions or terms not already imposed by the REPC and did not violate 
Harri sons' rights under the implied covenant. 
Harrisons assert that they were required to object to NYA's tender or waive any 
such objection under UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-5-802(3). Such section is inapplicable. It 
applies to written offers to pay a sum of money, deliver a written instrument or specific 
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personal property (UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-5-802(1)). The person to whom tendered is 
to specify any objection to the amount of money, terms of the written instrument or the ~ 
amount or kind of property. The section does not apply to the terms or conditions under 
which the written instrument is tendered. 
G 
Harrisons misstate or mischaracterize Century 21 All W. Real Estate & Inv. v. 
Webb, 645 P.2d 52 (Utah 1982) that the buyers had not made a valid tender because they 
insisted that the sellers accept their interpretation of their contract's requirements. The G.J 
contract provided that mortgages and encumbrances were to be paid by the seller, but 
there was a dispute as to whether seller had an obligation to remove a Citicorp 
encumbrance prior to closing. However, the Court's holding was actually that a letter 
asserting that the buyer was "ready and willing to close" the transaction, particularly 
when buyer had asserted, without contractual support, that the Citicorp encumbrance be 
satisfied before closing, was not a tender let alone an unconditional tender of buyer's 
money or payment obligation. 
NY A's tender of the Rejected Payment was timely, was consistent with Harrisons' 
existing obligations under the REPC and was unconditional. Harrisons breached the 
REPC by reject the Rejected Payment. This Court should affinn the district court's 
ruling that NY A's tender of the Rejected Payment was valid and that Harri sons breached 
the REPC by refusing to accept such tender. 
IV. HARRISONS FAILED TO PERFORM WHEN THEY REFUSED TO 
ACCEPT NYA'S TIMELY EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT AND EXTEND 
CLOSING. 
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The court found that Harrisons had breached the REPC by their refusal of NY A's 
valid tender. Harrisons confuse their actual breach of the REPC with an anticipatory 
breach. "[A] party's refusal to perform under the terms of an agreement constitutes a 
breach of that agreement." Cobabe v. Stanger, 844 P.2d 298, 303 (Utah 1992). 
Harrisons had a contractual obligation to accept the timely tender of the Rejected 
Payment and to extend the settlement deadline. Instead they rejected the Rejected 
Payment and returned it to NY A. Harrisons make the nonsensical argument that 
Harrisons "never refused to extend the closing deadline, only to accept the $6,250 
payment to do so." They also allege that Harrisons did not repudiate their obligation to 
sell the Property to NYA within 30 days. Harrisons assertion is false. The tender of the 
Rejected Payment was to extend the closing date an additional 30 days and not have to 
immediately close. Harrisons did not extend the settlement date. They repudiated their 
obligation to sell asserting in the September 2009 letter that NYA's failure to validly 
tender the Rejected Payment constituted another breach of the REPC for which Harrisons 
would amend their pleadings. Harrisons subsequently filed for summary judgment 
asserting that NY A's tender of the Rejected Payment was a breach of the REPC and that 
Harrisons were entitled to retain the earnest money. 
In contrast to a breach, an anticipatory breach is committed before the time of 
performance when a party manifests a positive and unequivocal not to render its 
promised performance. Id. Harrisons have asserted that their refusal to accept the 
Rejected Payment was not such a positive or unequivocal manifestation of their intent. 
However, such principle applies to anticipatory breaches and not to actual breaches. 
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Their breach consisted of their then present refusal to perform their obligations under the 
REPC. Their claimed manifestation of intent to perform is irrelevant once they have 
actually breached by rejecting NY A's tender. The court correctly determined that 
Harrisons breached the REPC by refusing to accept NY A's valid tender. 
It is well settled law that a "material breach by one party to a contract excuses further 
performance by the nonbreaching party." Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 
295, 301 {Utah App. 1994). The first party to substantially or materially breach "cannot ~ 
complain if the other party thereafter refuses to perform." CCD, L.C. v. Millsap, 116 P.3d 
366, 373 {Utah 2005) (internal quotation omitted). Harrisons were the first party to 
breach the REPC by their rejection of the Rejected Payment and cannot complain if NY A 
thereafter doesn't perform by making additional earnest money deposits or by closing the 
purchase. 
Because NY A's additional earnest money deposit was timely made and was 
consistent with the terms of the REPC, Harrisons materially breached the REPC by 
rejecting it and refusing to extend the closing. This Court should affirm the district 
court's ruling that Harrisons materially breached the REPC by refusing to accept NY A's 
valid tender of the August 31, 2009 Rejected Payment, returning it to NY A and refusing 
to extend the closing. 
V. THE HARRISONS FAILED TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE OF w 
MATERIALITY OF THEIR BREACH OF THE REPC. 
For the first time on appeal Harrisons raise the issue that their breach in rejecting 
the Rejected Payment was not a material breach. It is well settled that "to properly 
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preserve an issue for appellate review, the issue must be raised in the district court ... .the 
issue must be specifically raised, in a timely manner, and must be supported by evidence 
and relevant legal authority." Donjuan v. McDermott, 2011 UT 72, ,I20, 266 P.3d 839. 
Harrisons have never raised the issue of the materiality of their breach in rejecting the 
Rejected Payment, in any motion or otherwise. The issue has not been preserved for 
appeal. 
Strangely Harrisons' assertion is apparently based in part on the amount of the 
$6,250 Rejected Payment in relation to the $3,000,000 purchase price. It is unclear how 
rejection of a $6,250 payment regardless of the purchase price can be immaterial. 
Applying Harrisons apparent logic, that the $6,250 payment and its refusal was not 
material in light of the $3,000,000, NYA should not have had to tender the payment at all 
to secure the thirty day extension it desired, and any failure by NYA to tender what 
Harrisons now claim is an immaterial amount could not have been a breach by NY A. 
Obviously, Harrisons' logic is nonsensical. 
Regardless, Harrisons' assertion that their breach was not material is wrong. 
Without going into all of the factors of a material breach, since this issue was not 
previously raised by Harri sons and would be a question of fact anyway, their breach was 
clearly material. NY A contracted for the right to monthly pay additional earnest money 
to extend settlement and the closing. The settlement date and the right to extend it were 
substantial and material provisions of and crucial components of the REPC. NY A would 
be and was deprived of such benefits as a result of Harri sons' breach. Harrisons cannot 
now attempt to ignore the importance of the tender and rejection of the Rejected Payment 
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in order to claim that their breach was not material. Their current position is inconsistent 
with their position throughout the lawsuit. Harrisons rejection of the Rejected Payment CJ 
was a material breach. 
VI. NYA DID NOT ELECT TO PURSUE ACTUAL DAMAGES BUT 
ELECTED TO AND WAS ENTITLED TO RECOVER LIQUIDATED (:; 
DAMAGES 
The district court incorrectly held that NY A had elected the remedy of actual 
damages and therefore that NY A was not entitled to recover liquidated damages under 
the REPC in an amount equal to the amount of the Earnest Money Deposit as that term 
was defined in the REPC. 
A. NYA PLEAD ALTERNATIVELY FOR ACTUAL AND 
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES FOR HARRISONS' BREACH 
The general rule of election of remedies is set forth in Angelos v. First Interstate 
Bank, 671 P.2d 772, 778, (Utah 1983) where the Supreme Court stated that: 
The doctrine of election of remedies is a technical rule of procedure and its 
purpose is not to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to prevent double 
redress for a single wrong. Said doctrine presupposes a choice between 
inconsistent remedies, a knowledgeable selection of one thereof, free of 
fraud or imposition, and a resort to the chosen remedy evincing a purpose 
to forego all others. Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibralter Financial Corp., 
Utah, 603 P.2d 793, 796 (1979) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). 
The purpose of the election of remedies is to prevent a double redress for a single 
wrong. However, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and modem pleading practice allow 
a party to plead alternative theories and even to have such theories presented to the court 
or Jury. Utah R. Civ. P 8(a) sets very minimal requirements for pleading an original 
claim: 
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(a) Claims for relief An original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-
party claim shall contain a short and plain: ( 1) statement of the claim 
showing that the party is entitled to relief; and (2) demand for judgment for 
specified relief. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may 
be demanded .... 
Utah courts have adopted a very liberal approach to pleading. In MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. 
v. Goodman, 2006 UT App 276, ,6, 140 P.3d 589 the court stated: 
Under our liberal standard of notice pleading, a plaintiff is required "to 
submit a 'short and plain statement ... showing that the pleader is entitled 
to relief and a demand for judgment for the relief."' Canfield v. Layton 
City, 2005 UT 60, Pl4, 122 P.3d 622 (omission in original) (quoting Utah 
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(l)-(2)). "The plaintiff must only give the defendant fair 
notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general 
indication of the type of litigation involved. 
In addressing the pleading of alternative remedies, the Court m Parrish v. 
Tahtaras, 318 P .2d 642, 645 {Utah 1957) stated: 
The alternate remedies, although formerly limited by a strict election 
doctrine, may be pleaded in alternative form and may even be inserted by 
amendment late in the proceedings. Taylor v. E. M. Royle Corp., 1 Utah 2d 
175,264 P.2d 279 {Utah 1953); U.R.C.P. 54(c)(l). 
Consistent with Parrish Utah R. Civ. P 54{c)(l) provides that: 
... every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose 
favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such 
relief in his pleadings. [Emphasis added]. 
A party is to include a short plain statement that it is entitled to relief and make a 
demand for judgment for the relief. It is entitled to judgment for the relief to which the 
party is entitled even if it has not demanded that relief. NY A's amended complaint 
satisfied these liberal pleading requirements. It sets forth three claims including, first, 
rescission of the REPC, second, if the court found the REPC was a binding agreement 
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that NY A was entitled to damages, and third, declaratory judgment. In the prayer of the 
second claim upon which the court granted NY A summary judgment from Harrisons' 
breach, Plaintiff prayed that NY A be granted "a judgment awarding New York the 
damages that it incurred as a result of the Defendants' breach of the REPC." (R 33) 
NYA's amended complaint did not state that it sought actual damages nor did it 
state that it was not seeking liquidated damages. Rather it merely included typical 
general pleading language under Rule 8 seeking damages under the REPC for the t.:J 
Harrisons' breach. NYA has been unable to locate any Utah cases which have held that a 
party is required in its complaint to assert whether it seeks liquidated damages or actual 
damages. NYA's amended complaint does not constitute an election under Angelos by 
choosing the remedy of actual damages and evidencing that NY A was electing to forego 
liquidated damages. 
In its 2012 summary judgment motion (R290-3 l 9), NY A sought not only the 
return of the earnest money deposits it had made, but liquidated damages in an amount 
equal to the earnest money deposits. In its subsequent summary judgment motion for 
damages, NY A again sought the return of its earnest money deposits and liquidated 
damages in an amount equal to the earnest money deposits. (R728-752) Such motions 
notified Harrisons of NY A's claim that Harrisons pay NYA its liquidated damages and 
constituted demands therefore. 
B. NYA WAS NOT REQUIRED TO NOTIFY HARRISONS OF ITS 
ELECTION TO SEEK LIQUIDATED DAMAGES BY A WRITTEN 
DEMAND OR NOTICE. 
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The trial court nonetheless held that NY A was obligated to make a written notice 
to and demand on Harrisons for liquidated damages and that by failing to do so NY A had 
contractually elected to pursue actual damages. 
REPC ,Il 6 provides as follows: 
DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect either to retain the Earnest 
Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or to return it and sue Buyer to 
specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies available at law. 
If Seller defaults, in addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer 
may elect to either accept from Seller a sum equal to the Earnest Money 
Deposit as liquidated damages, or may sue Seller to specifically enforce this 
contract or pursue other remedies available at law. If Buyer elects to accept 
liquidated damages, Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer 
upon demand. 
Under ,II 6 there is a difference between the respective elections of buyer and 
seller seeking liquidated damages. Sellers elect liquidated damages by retaining the 
earnest money deposit. In order for sellers to sue to enforce the contract or to pursue 
other remedies at law, sellers are contractually obligated to first return the earnest money 
deposit. Consistent with the language of the REPC, sellers who have not returned the 
earnest money are not permitted to seek actual damages. See McKeon v. Crump, 2002 
UT App 258, 53 P .3d 494. The same procedure does not apply to buyers. If sellers 
default, buyers may elect to accept from sellers a sum equal to the earnest money deposit 
as liquidated damages, may sue sellers to specifically enforce the contract or may pursue 
other remedies available at law. There is no contractual provision as to how buyers are to 
make such election, nor is there a prerequisite before a buyer may seek liquidated 
damages, specifically enforce the contract or seek actual damages. However the REPC 
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provides that, if a buyer does make the election to accept liquidated damages, the seller 
is obligated to pay them upon demand. 
There are no Utah cases defining how buyers under REPC's are to make the 
election to accept liquidated damages nor imposing a notice or demand obligation as a 
condition to making such election. 
The trial court determined that NY A was required to make a demand in order to 
elect liquidated damages, and that by virtue of the failure to make the demand that NY A ~ 
had elected liquidated damages. As support for its requirement the court cited a number 
of cases involving different contractual provisions. Van Zyverden v. Farrar, 393 P.2d 
468 (Utah 1964) was an unlawful detainer action involving a forfeiture under a real 
estate contract which the contract language required a written notice to the buyer of the 
forfeiture and that buyer had become a tenant at will. Commercial Inv. Corp. v. Siggard, 
936 P.2d 1105 (Utah App. 1997) involved a forfeiture (which the "law abhors" and 
under which the court stated the seller must comply strictly with the notice provisions) of 
a uniform real estate contract. The contract required two separate notices to the buyer, 
one was a notice of default, and the other was a notice informing buyer of his failure to 
cure and of seller's election of the forfeiture remedy. The contract language itself 
required notice of the election remedy. See also Adair v. Bracken, 745 P.2d 849 (Utah 
App. 1987). 
Such cases are inapplicable to the instant case because there is no similar notice 
requirement for buyers under REPC 116. Nor is there a demand requirement under 
REPC 116 to elect the remedy ofliquidated damages. The language of 116 merely states 
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that the buyer may make an election to accept liquidated damages. Contrary to the trial 
court's ruling there was no contractual requirement of a demand or notice in order to 
elect liquidated damages under the REPC. 
Since neither the REPC nor Utah cases have defined how to elect liquidated 
damages, the above principles of Angelos apply. To make an election, the buyer would 
have to do something to evidence that it had made a choice of remedy and foregone the 
other available remedies. Moreover under Angelos, NY A's election of remedies should 
only be applied to protect Harrisons from double recovery. 
C. NYA DID NOT ELECT TO PURSUE ACTUAL DAMAGES. 
The trial court ruled that because of the stage to which NY A had litigated the 
matter, it had contractually elected "to pursue other remedies available at law", namely 
actual damages. NY A is unaware of any Utah case law in which litigation of breach of 
contract claims that seek damages, without a designation of actual or liquidated, 
constitutes an election to seek actual damages. Such ruling is contrary to Angelos, 
Parrish and the U.R.C.P. which allow the pleading of alternate claims and alternate 
remedies and only preclude double recoveries. Because NY A did not do anything in its 
litigation to indicate that it had made a choice to pursue actual damages and to forego 
liquidated damages, NY A should not be deemed to have made such election. The only 
evidence of a choice of remedy from the NY A's pleadings is NY A's initial summary 
judgment motion and its summary judgment motion for damages which both sought 
liquidated damages. Such pleadings are the only evidence of its choice of a remedy. 
NY A did not by its actions elect actual damages. The court should reverse the trial 
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court's holding and order that NYA had elected actual damages and return the matter to 
the trial court to award NY A its liquidated damages in the amount of the earnest money 
deposits made. 
VII. NYA IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ADDITIONAL ATTORNEY'S 
FEES ~ 
A. NYA IS ENTITLED TO AN ADDITIONAL A WARD OF 
ATTORNEYS FEES FOR RESEARCH. 
In conjunction with its summary judgment motion for damages, NY A submitted G,; 
attorneys fees affidavits which complied with the requirements of Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 {Utah 1988); EDSA/Cloward, LLC v. Klibanoff, 2008 UT App 
284, 192 P.3d 296 {Utah App. 2008); and Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266 
(Utah 1992), including descriptions of the work performed, the hours spent and the 
hourly rate. Each of the attorneys fees affidavits asserted that the work was reasonable 
and necessary. Harrisons objected because the affidavits did not identify the items or 
subjects researched nor did they identify the legal issues discussed with NY A. NY A 
asserted that disclosure of such detail was not required by the above cases and would be a 
violation of the work product rule and attorney client privilege. However, NYA's 
counsel submitted an affidavit that generally described the initial research issues and 
confinned that the research entries at the time of each memorandum were relative to the 
issues in such memoranda. (R907-910) Notwithstanding, such affidavits, the trial court ~ 
declined to award NYA certain of its attorneys fees for research because the subjects of 
the research were not disclosed. (R922). 
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Although the above cited cases include the requirement that the attorneys affidavit 
describe the work performed, no Utah cases require that the subjects researched be 
disclosed in such affidavit nor do they require disclosure of the legal issues discussed 
with the client. Subjects researched constitute attorney work product and should not be 
required to be disclosed in order to be entitled to recover such attorneys fees. Nor should 
the legal issues discussed with the client be subject to disclosure in order to recover for 
such attorneys work since they are confidential. NY A should be awarded additional 
attorneys fees with respect to the any time spent for research or legal issue discussions 
that were not awarded by the trial court because the subjects of the research or the issues 
discussed were not disclosed in the affidavits. 
B. IF THE COURT DETERMINES THAT NYA IS ENTITLED TO 
PURSUE ITS LIQUIDATED DAMAGES CLAIMS, NYA IS 
ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEYS FEES FOR SUCH 
CLAIMS. 
Trial courts are entitled to detennine who is the prevailing party in litigation and 
are to apply a variety of factors set forth in R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 40 P.3d 1119, 
1126-27, (Utah 2002). The trial court determined that NYA was the prevailing party and 
that attorneys fees were to be awarded. However, the trial court determined that NY A 
was not the prevailing party as to the part of its summary judgment motion for damages, 
as to the liquidated damages. If the Court determines that NY A is entitled to liquidated 
damages and to pursue such liquidated damages, then NY A would be the prevailing party 
as to such liquidated damages claims. NY A would therefore be entitled to an award of its 
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attorneys fees with respect to the liquidated damages claims that had not previously been 
awarded. 
C. NYA IS ENTITLED TO ITS ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL. 
"Generally, 'when a party who received attorneys fees below prevails on appeal, 
the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal.' Brown v. Richards, 840 
P.2d 143, 156 {Utah App. 1992)." Robertson's Marine, Inc. v. 14 Solutions, Inc., 2010 
UT App 9, ,16, 223 P.3d 1141 (Utah App. 2010). Since Harrisons appeal is not well GJ 
taken, NYA, as the prevailing party, should be entitled to its additional reasonable 
attorneys fees incurred on this appeal. 
The Court should remand the matter to the trial court for the award of additional 
attorneys fees to NY A for attorneys fees for research that was not previously awarded, 
for attorneys fees associated with its liquidated damages claims and for attorneys fee on 
appeal. 
VIII. NYA IS ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL PREJUDGMENT INTEREST. 
A. NYA IS ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT INTEREST FROM THE 
DATE OF EACH PAYMENT OF EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT. 
In the 2014 Order and Judgment, NYA was granted prejudgment interest on the 
earnest money deposits it had made at the rate of 10% per annum as provided in UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 15-1-1{2) from the date of the Harrisons' August 31, 2009 breach. (R 921) 
It is well established under Utah law that: 
As to the allowance of interest before judgment, this court has heretofore 
spoken, and the law in Utah is clear, viz: where the damage is complete 
and the amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular time, and that loss can 
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be measured by facts and figures, interest should be allowed from that time 
and not from the date of judgment. 
Bjork v. April Indus., 560 P .2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977) As a matter of public policy, 
prejudgment interest is awarded to compensate a party for the depreciating value of the 
amount owed over time and, as a corollary, to deter parties from intentionally 
withholding an amount that is liquidated and owing. See Trail Mt. Coal Co. v. Utah 
Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 921 P.2d 1365 (Utah 1996); In Anderson, supra, the 
trial court had awarded prejudgment interest on the earnest money, down payment and 
taxes that had been paid from the date each of the payments were made. The court of 
appeals, applying the principles of Bjork, affirmed such award of prejudgment interest 
from the date of each payment because the damage was complete, the loss could be 
measured and the amount of each loss was fixed as of a particular time, namely as of 
the date of each payment. Id at ,I28. The same is true in the instant case. NY A should 
be entitled to prejudgment interest as of the date of each of its payments of earnest 
money. 
In addition, if NY A is not awarded prejudgment interest from the date of each 
payment, Harrisons would receive the benefit and use of NY A's money during the time 
they had it without compensation to NY A. NY A would not be compensated for the 
period from each payment to the date of the August 31, 2009 for the depreciating value 
of the money owed. The deterrent effect on Harrisons would be reduced. 
The court should award NY A interest at I 0% per annum on each earnest money 
payment from the date of such payment and not just from the date of Harrisons' breach. 
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Such interest amounts have already been submitted to the court by affidavit. (R760-
762) 
B. NYA IS ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT INTEREST FROM 
AUGUST 31, 2009 ON THE LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AMOUNT. 
If the Court determines that NY A is entitled to liquidated damages and to pursue 
such liquidated damages, then NY A would also be entitled to prejudgment interest on the 
liquidated damages amount at least from the date of the August 31, 2009. See Bjork, G 
Supra and see Trail Mt. Coal Co. Supra for the public policy reasons that prejudgment 
interest should be awarded on the liquidated damages. 
CONCLUSION 
The court should deny Harrisons' appeal and should affirm the court's orders from 
which Harrisons appealed. The court should reverse the court's order that NYA elected 
actual damages and should remand the matter to the trial court to award NY A liquidated 
damages to NY A, interest on the liquidated damages to NY A, to award NY A interest on 
the earnest money payments from the dates thereof and to award attorney fees relative to 
the liquidated damages to, for research work not awarded and for attorneys fees on 
appeal. Jt. 
Respectfully submitted this£ day of J1ZJ,015. ,.. 
-~~~..-C.'r---'..-:;;;_---------,1~-#-1--,.~--
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Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 
Statutes current through the acts of the 2015 General Session signed through March 20, 2015 
Utah Code Annotated 
Title 15 Contracts and Obligations in General 
Chapter 1 Interest 
15-1-1. Interest rates - Contracted rate - Legal rate. 
• (1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for the loan or forbearance 
of any money, goods, or chose in action that is the subject of their contract. 
• (2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the legal rate of interest 
~ for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action shall be 10% per annum. 
• (3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to affect any penalty or interest charge 




L. 1907, ch. 46, § 1; C.L. 1907, § 1241; C.L. 1917, § 3320; R.S. 1933, 44-0-1; L. 1935, ch. 42, § 1; C. 
1943, 44-0-1; L. 1981, ch. 73, § 1; 1985, ch. 159, § 6; 1989, ch. 79, § 1. 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 
EXHIBIT 2 
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.ADDENDUfJI NO. 1 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
Pagel of I 
THIS IS AN ADDENDUM ta- that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the 11REPCj with an 
Offer Reference Date of November 9. 2006 between New YOik Ave.. U..C .. as 8uyer .. and Hanis~ David & 
Jan. as Se!fer. reganfmg the Property, 20.27 Acres off 950 W and approximately 700 S in Springville. UT -







Seiter disclosure deadline to be 14 days from date of fully executed contract. 
Due diligence deadrtne to be 90 days from date of fully exeouted contract to do any and all due_ 
dmg~ '\ha\ \he bu'yet deems necessaty ot ptudern: to de\errnine -\hat fue 'J)ropet\:t \s sa'\i~iac\ocy 1or. · 
Buyer's intended use. The due diligence approval shall be at the buyers sol& and absolute discretion. 
Settlement deadline to be 180 days frOm date of fully executed contract 
$31000, 000 purchase price· is based on the assumption that the property contains 20.27 Acres, whioh · · 
equates to $148,002 per acre. If the exact acreage is more or Jess than 20.27 acres the purchase price • 
wm increase or decrease accordingly based on $1481002 per acre. -~::-
-
Buyer wilt deposit the eamest money with First American Trtle Company located in Orem, Utah, within 5. · 
business days from the date of a fulJy executed contract. ___.,,_ • 
_.,,,. . 




Seller agrees to $ign within a reasonable time period alJ pertinent applications and documents requTred 
for governmental approval of Buyefs proposed development 
Seifer agrees to give eccess to the Property during daylight hours for any testing. inspections, 
surveying, and other similar $8MC8s for developing the Property, as the Buyer deems necessary. If 
any type of large motorized equipment will be brought onto the property it will be coordinated through 
the current lessee of the property as to minimize the lmpact on the current crop. 
Buyer will be deemed to have approved the Property if the Buyer has not terminated this agreement by 
the Due Diligence Deadline. The day following the Due omg·ence Deadline. the title company will 
disperse the earnest money to tile Sefler. Thfs earnest money wm then be deemed earned and non-
refundable thereafter if Buyer fans to close for any reason. Released earnest money is the sole remedy 
to tlle Seller if the Buyer falls to close for any reason. 
1 0. The Buyer may chooSe. at his sore discretio~ to pay an additional amount of non-refundable earnest ;;. . 
money to continue the C()llfract monthly after the settlement deadfme. This additional moneyvvill be pai ·· · 
monthly at a rate of $12,500 per month, and wm be a credit towards the purchase price at closing. 
11. If Buyer terminates this transaction for any reason, Buyer will turn over au surveys, engineering. soi 
reports, phase I reports. etc. that may have been completed at no additT~~st to the Setler. 
Seller shall have until 5:00 PM Mountain Time_ November 1 S. 20061 to accept the tenns of 1his ADOENQ\t 
NO. 1 In acoordance With the provisions of Section 23 qf the REPC. Unless so accepted. .the offer as se{f.:.:,.=-· 




Nov 10 06 00.29p 
Nov OS U~ 03:~~p au t - .a r ~ - -r c. , "< 
CH.Ea<ONe: 
PQ ACCS>TANCE! SellerJl~y accepts me taflftS.of WG AtlOENOUM NO. ,. 
[ 1 COUNieROFFeft $$lie,~~ u a cwnterofftrtrte terfl'G ctf 
at=~ AODe!OUll NO. __ 











Ii ADDENDUM NO~ Z TO ~ ESrATE ~ CONfflACT 
-
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LAS VEGAS, NV 
LOS ANGELES, CA 
PHILADELPHIA. PA 
PHOENIX, AZ 




STEVEN J. NEWMAN 
DIRECT DIAL: (801) 517-6878 
PERSONAL FAX: (801) 596-6878 
E--MAIL: NEWMANS@BALLARDSPAHR.COM 
March 5, 2009 
Via Federal Express and E-mail kkelly@rqn.com 
Keith A. Kelly, Esq. 
Ray Quinney & Nebeker 
PO ·Box 45385 
Salt ~e City, Utah 84111 
Re: Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC") between David and Jan Harrison 
("Seller''} and New York Ave., LLC ("Buyer'') 
Dear Mr. Kelly: 
·My firm has been retained· to represent the. Seller in connection with the matter 
referenced above. Please advise the Buyer that the Seller: (i) is. not willing to terminate the 
contract pursuant to the terms set-forth in your letter to Seller dated February 17, 2009; and (ii) 
does not-agx:ee with your characterization of the facts concerning the REPC as set forth in your 
letter. 
· After reviewing the REPC, we· have determined that the Due Diligence Deadline 
has expired and., while the Buyer has the right to extend the Settlement Date by making an 
Extension Payment each month, the ~PC is silent as to an outside Settlement Date and is 
therefore silent a~ to when Buyer's performance under the REPC must occur. It is unreasonable 
tQ interpret the extension provision in the REPC as allowing the Buyer to extend the Settlenient . 
indefinitely. It is well established in Utah that when a contract fails to specify a time by which a 
certain act must be performed, law implies that the act must be done within. a reasonable time 
under the circumstances. See Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 at 1242.· It has been 
over 16 months sirice the original Settlement Deadline, 1;3uyer has not closed on the purchase of 
the property, and any reasonable time for closing has already p~sed .. 
We view Buyer's failure to close as a breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing .. Notwithstanding this breach, Seller is willing to close on or before August 
5, 2009. Otheiwise, Seller reserves all of Seller's rights and remedies set forth in the REPC. 
OMWEST #6792353 v2 
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At your earliest convenience, please call me to discuss a reasonable Settlement 
Deadline .. 
Very truly yours, 
Steven J. Newman 
SJN/sjn 
cc: David and Jan Harrison (via fax) 
Chris Anderson (via e-mail) 
Steven Kelly (via fed-ex) 
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801 342-2400 TEL 
801 375-8379 FAX 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
August 31, 2009 
Via Hand-Delivery, Email & Telefax 
Mark R Gaylord 
Jason D. Boren 
Steven J. Newman 
Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP 
Suite 800 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2221 
Re: Real Estate Purchase Contract between 
David and Jan Harrison, and New York Ave., LLC 
Extension Payment for August of 2009 
Dear Mark, Jason & Steven: 
As you are aware, I represent New York Ave, LLC, regarding the Real 
Estate Purchase Contract for Land ("REPC"), between your clients, David and 
Jan Harrison ("the Harrisons" or "Sellers"), and New York Ave, LLC ("my 
client" or "Buyer"). Originally, your clients the Harrisons signed the REPC on 
November 10, 2006, and they signed addenda# 1 and #2 on November 10, 2006 
and November 22, 2006, respectively. The REPC involved the sale of your 
clients' property located at approximately 950 W. and 700 S., Springville, UT, 
also known as parcel #26-041-0031, on November 10, 2006. This REPC is the 
subject of a lawsuit entitled New York Ave., LLC v. David D. & Jan. C. 
Harrison, Case No. 090402295 (Utah 4th D. Court) ("NY v. Harrison"). 
The REPC contains a clause with a due diligence period of90 days in 
which my client had the ability to cancel the REPC at its discretion. The REPC 
also contains a clause, paragraph 10 in Addendum No. 1, that allows my client 
to extend the settlement deadline at monthly increments by paying an 
"additional amount of non-refundable earnest money'' ("Extension 
Payment(s)") that would "be a credit towards the purchase price at closing." 
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As you know, during the due diligence period, my client learned that the 
city sewer was not available to service this property, thus making development 
of this property not economically feasible at the time at the current purchase 
price. It was possible that development would not be economically feasable for 
a number of years at the cwrent purchase price. Therefore, prior to the end of 
the 90 day due diligence perio~ ·the REPC was renegotiated as memorialized in 
Addendum No. 2, dated November 22, 2006. At the time of the signing of · 
addendum #2, my client made your clients aware that the sewer was not 
available to the property as originally anticipated. Therefore, the contract was 
amended due to the fact that the property could not be developed as originally 
anticipated. 
Addendum No. 2, among other things, extended the settlement deadline 
to October 31, 2007, included. 20.27 water shares in the sale, and reduced the 
monthly Extension Payment from $12,500 to $6,250, based on the 
understanding that it could take several years before this deal could be closed. 
This amendment was also based upon my client's understanding that: · 
(a) The purchase price for the property was based on the 
asswnption that it could be developed as single family 
residential that would maximize the development potential of 
the land base<f on the zoning laws in place that govern the 
subject property. With the lack of sewer capabilities, and 
through further information garnered through the 
development process that showed insufficient storm drainage 
capacity, the property could not (at the time) be developed to 
its maximum potential. 
(b) The ability to postpone closing on the property until it could 
be developed to its maximum potential was crucial to my 
clients. Accordingly, Extension Payments were "a credit 
towards the purchase price" of the property as stated in the 
REPC and was in no way to be considered "rent" or an 
interest payment. 
( c) The closing deadline was being extended and Extension 
Payment reduced in part to account for the fact that, since the 
sewer was not readily available, it might be some time before 
the property could be developed as anticipated. 
(d) The REPC could be extende~ at my client's discretion as 
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to its full potential. This includes, but is not limited to: sewer 
line extension installed to the property, storm drainage 
readily available, and property being economically feasible to 
develop under zoning ordinances of Springville city and 
existing market conditions. 
My client has deposited $6,250 with First American Title Company on 
. or before the last day of each and every month since the settlement deadline 
noted in Addendum No. 2, thereby extending the settlement deadline every 
month since that s~ttlement deadline. You have denied this point, apparently 
claiming each such payment has not been made. This denial is found in 
paragraph 19 of your Answer ("Answer') filed in NY v. Harrison. 
My client has performed and is continuing to perform under the parties' 
REPC. Accordingly, my client hereby provides you with the $6,250 August 
2009 Extension Payment We invite you to carefully discuss with your clients 
what they understood was the purpose of Amendment No. 2 to the REPC. !!Y 
negotiating this $6,250 check. you are agreeing with my client that it is entitled 
under the REPC to make these payments in order to postpone closing in 
accordance with the express terms of the REPC until it is economically feasible 
to move forward with a residential development of the property as discussed 
above, including in paragraphs {a) through (d). My client is simply seeking the 
benefit of its bargain wider ·the REPC, and nothing more - in light of your 
claims that my client may not now close under the REPC. Nothing in this letter 
should b.e construed as a demand by my clients for any rights or benefits other 
than those provided under the REPC. 
I look forward to discussing this matter with you further in an attempt to 
resolve your clients' concerns. Nothing herein constitutes a waiver or election 
of any remedies or rights by my client 
Sincerely, 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
~~' 
·Keith A. Kell~ / . 
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September 2, 2009 
·VIA FACSIMILE AND HAND DELIVERY 
Keith A Kelly, Esq; 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
36 S State Street #1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
. · Re: New York Ave, L.L.C. v. David and Jan Harrison. 
Civil No. 090402295 · 





LAS VE'GAS, NV 
LOS ANGELES, CA 




·we are in receipt of your letter dated August 31,_ 2009, in the above-referenced matter. 
· Like your previous ·correspondence, your letter attempts to insert conditions and other terins 
which are not partofthe Real Estate Purchase Contract betweenNewYork Ave, LLC and David . 
and Jan Harrison. · · · · · 
. Contrary to your assertions, the contract.was ~ot amended due to the alleged 
unavailability of the sewer. "If your client was not satisfied with what it discovered during the 
due diligence period, the Real Estate Purchase Contract provided for .specific procedures to 
address such concerns. Your client failed to provide any written objections p_ursuant fo the Real 
Estate Purchase Contract and· cannot now claim that it was dissatisfied with what it discovered in 
the due diligence· period. · 
Despite your client's claims that it canriot develop the property as originally anticipated, 
it has done nothing, to our kriowledge, to obtain sewer, ·or any other development rights or other 
entitlements that may affect development of the property. Your client cannot sit idly by and wait 
for someone else to accomplish what is solely within its ability and control. To do so constitutes 
a breac~ of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing . . 
Moreover, your client's unexpressed intentions and "understanding" are simply irrelevant · 
to the express language of the ,Real Estate Purchase Contract. See Jaramillo v . .Farmers Ins. · 











· Keith A. Kelly, Esq. 
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Group, 669·P.2d 1i31, 1233 (U~ 1983)("1t is.well established in the law that unexpressed 
· intentions do not affect the. validity of a contract''}.- . 
. . 
In short, your attempt to 1n:odify th~ terms of the Real Estate Purchase Contract and to . 
make the negotiation of.the monthly check conditioned upon your client's unilateral and 
unexpressed intentions and "understanding' is not only inappropriate, but constitutes a further 
· breac~ of the parti~' Real Estate Purchase Contract S~ Shields v. Harris, 934 P.2d 653 (Utah 
App. 1997) (valid tender requires buyer to make bona fide unconditional offer of payment). 
· Accordingly~ we enclos~ and return the check that you hand delivered to our offices. Please be 
advised that we will continue to accept the monthly checks so long as you withdraw·your 
- · inappropriate cc;>n~itions. · · 
By reason of your inappropriate. and conditional tender of these monies; my ci.ients.in~d 
to· amend their counterclaim to·assert· a claim for your client's latest breach. Please notify ine t,y 
the end of the week whether yo~ will stipulate to allow the Harrisons to amend their 
cowiterclaim~· In the event you refuse to do so, we will file·a motion to ·~end with the Court. 
We look forward to your response. 
Additionally, as you know, it has always been our ~sition that the transaction should be 
·closeci witlµnareasonable time. See Bra#/ord:v. Alvey & Sons, ~2-1 P.2d 1240 (Itis well 
established in Utah that when a contract fails to specify a time by w~ch a certain ·act must be 
-perfonned, the law implies that the a« must be done within a reasonable time). We have always 
been willing to discuss and negoµate a--reasonabie closing date. You have rejected our· offers and 
attempts .. W.e continue to be 'Yilling ~o discuss ~s matter.· Howe~eri we believe the b~ is.in. 
your court. _Please let me know if you have any ·i~terest in discussing this matter further. 
JDB/ldi 
· Enclosure 
· cc: Mark R. Gaylord, -Esq. · 
Steven J: Newman; Esq. 
Michael D: Mayfield, Esq. 
Mr. David Harrison · 
OMWEST #7275701 v1 
. . 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




DAVID D. HARRISON, an individual, and 
JAN C. HARRISON, an individual, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON CROSS MOTIONS 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Date: June 14, 2012 
Case No: 090402295 
Judge David N. Mortensen 
This matter is before the court on cross motions for summary judgment. The motion were 
fully briefed and argued before the court on April 19, 2012. The court has been fully informed 
and for reasons more fully set forth below denies defendant's motion and grants plaintiffs 
motion in part. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
A motion for summary judgment will be granted where "the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law," and "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "[A]n adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 




Additionally, the court "will view the facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the 






UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
NYA is a Utah limited liability company doing business in Utah County, Utah. Steven 
Kelly is the registered agent and manager of NY A. 
The Harrisons are the owners of over 20 acres of real property located at approximately 
950 West 700 South in the Springville, Utah (the "Property"). 
On or about November I 0, 2006, the parties entered into a real estate purchase contract 
("REPC") whereby NY A agreed to purchase the Property for $3 million. 
Addendum #I, signed along with the REPC, provided that the Settlement Deadline 
was 180 days from the date of the fully executed contract. 
Addendum # 1 provided as follows: 
"The Buyer may choose, at his· sole discretion, to pay an additional amount of non-
refundable earnest money to continue the contract monthly after the settlement deadline. 
This additional money will be paid monthly at a rate of $12,500 per month, and will be a 
credit towards the purchase price at closing." 
6. On November 22, 2006, the parties entered into Addendum #2. 
7. Addendum #2 provided that the "settlement deadline is to be extended until after the 
harvest season 2007 which will be October 31, 2007." 
-2-
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8. Addendum #2 reduced the Extension Payments to $6,250 per month and required the 
Harrisons to include 20.27 water shares with the purchase. 
9. The parties have not agreed in writing to a limitation on the number of extensions of the 




The REPC and addenda provided that the initial earnest money deposit of $10,000 along 
with the monthly Extension Payments all constitute non-refundable earnest money that 
would have been applied to the purchase price at closing. 
The parties have not entered into any addenda to the REPC other than Addendum # 1 and 
Addendum #2 nor any other written agreements modifying the REPC. 
REPC Addendum #2 states that the "date of the fully executed contract is to be the latest 
signature date on this Addendum #2," which is November 22, 2006. 




Under the terms of the REPC, NY A had 90 days from the date of the fully executed 
contract to conduct due diligence (the "Due Diligence Deadline"). 
If, prior to the Due Diligence Deadline, NY A determined that the results of its due 
diligence were unacceptable, it could choose to cancel the contract or to provide written 
notice to the Harrisons of its objections. 
After the Due Diligence Deadline the earnest money was "deemed earned and non-
refundable thereafter if Buyer fails to close for any reason." 
-3-
17. On January 30, 2007, Mr. Kelly wrote a letter to the Harrisons informing them of a 
problem connecting the Property to the Springville sewer system. He further stated: 
\/9 
18. 
"It looks like I won't be able to develop the property until mid-2008 at the earliest. 
However, I like the property and want to continue the contract as it is currently 
written ... On October 31st I will start making the monthly payments to you that we agreed 
upon until I close the property, which will be when the sewer trunk line is installed and I 
can get the necessary approvals from the city to develop." 
On September 19, 2007, Mr. Kelly wrote a letter to the Harrisons updating them on his 
progress in developing the Property. Specifically, he informed them that he had found a 
way to work around the problem with connecting to the Springville sewer system. He 
further stated, "I will be paying the extension fees as outlined in the purchase contract 
until I close. It shouldn't be too far into the future." 
19. In October 2007, NYA began making the monthly Extension Payments in accordance 
with the terms of the REPC and its addenda. 
20. In early 2008, Mr. Kelly attempted to get approval from Springville City to work around 
the sewer trunk line issue. 
21. 
22. 
In April 2008, Mr. Kelly disclosed to his site engineer Brian Gabler that "[W]e are 
holding off pursuing this at the current time." 
In July 2008, Mr. Harrison informed Mr. Kelly that he did not want to wait any longer for 
-4-
23. 
NY A to close. 
In December 2008, Mr. Harrison began discussing with Mr. Kelly his options for 
terminating the contract. The parties did not come to an agreement. 
24. On March 5, 2009, the Harrisons through their attorney, Steve Newman, sent a letter to 




any reasonable time for closing had passed. 
The March 5, 2009 letter asserted that NYA was in breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, but that the Harrisons were willing to close on or before 
August 5, 2009. 
The March 5, 2009 letter asserted that if not closed by August 5, 2009, the Harrisons 
reserved all their rights and remedies under the REPC. 
On April 22, 2009, NY A's counsel sent a letter that stated, "My clients have the right to 
continue making the Extension Payments under the Contract, without an arbitrary and 
artificial August 5, 2009 deadline." 
28. NY A did not agree in writing, or otherwise, to the August 5, 2009 closing date. 
,-..c) 
29. On May 14, 2009, after a failed settlement negotiation, the Harrisons informed NYA that 
30. 
it expected it to continue to perform its obligations under the REPC. 
On August 31, 2009, NY A's counsel sent Harrison's counsel the Extension Payment 
along with a letter that contained that following: 
-5-
(a) The purchase price for the property was based on the assumption that it could be 
developed as single family residential that would maximize the development potential of 
the land based on the zoning laws in place that govern the subject property. With the lack 
of sewer capabilities, and through further information garnered through the development 
process that showed insufficient storm drainage capacity, the property could not (at the 
time) be developed to its maximum potential. 
(b) The ability to postpone closing on the property until it could be developed to its 
maximum potential was crucial to my clients. Accordingly, Extension Payments were "a 
credit towards the purchase price" of the property as stated in the REPC and was in no 
way to be considered "rent" or an interest payment. 
( c) The closing deadline was being extended and the Extension Payment reduced in part 
to account for the fact that, since the sewer was not readily available, it might be some 
time before the property could be developed as anticipated. 
( d) The REPC could be extended, at [NY A's] discretion as stated in the REPC, to allow 
for the property to be developed to its full potential. This includes, but is not limited to: 
sewer line extension installed to the property, storm drainage readily available, and 
-6-
property being economically feasible to develop under zoning ordinance of Springville 
City and existing market conditions. 
31. The August 2009 letter accompanying the Extension Payment stated, "Nothing in this 
letter should be construed as a demand by [Plaintiff] for any rights or benefits other than 
those provided under the REPC." 
32. 
33. 
The Harrisons refused to accept the August 2009 Extension Payment as presented and in 
a letter from their counsel to NY A's counsel stated, "[Y]our attempt to modify the terms 
of the [REPC] and to make the negotiation of the monthly check conditioned upon your 
client's unilateral and unexpressed intentions and 'understanding' is not only 
inappropriate, but constitutes a further breach of the parties' [REPC. ]" 
The Harrisons informed NY A that they would "continue to accept the monthly checks so 
long as [NY A] withdraw [its] inappropriate conditions." 
vi> 34. NY A has not closed on the Property and has not made or attempted to make any 
extension payments since August 2009 . 
. ANALYSIS 
1. Time of Performance 
The Harrisons argue that NY A breached by failing to perform within a reasonable time. 
v4' "[I]f a contract fails to specify a time of performance the law implies that it shall be done within 
a reasonable time under the circumstances." Coulter & Smith Ltd v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 858 
(Utah 1998) (citing Watson v. Hatch, 728 P.2d 989, 990 (Utah 1986)). "When the parties to a 
VI) 
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bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed with respect to a term which is 
essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a term which is reasonable in the 
circumstances is supplied by the court." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 204. A court "may 
allow a contract to be performed within a reasonable time only when the contract is silent as to 
the time for its performance." Watson v. Hatch. 728 P.2d 989,990 (Utah 1986). 
The parties explicitly agreed in the REPC and the addenda that the settlement deadline 
would be October 31, 2007. They also agreed that NYA "may choose, at its sole discretion, to 
pay an additional amount of non-refundable earnest money to continue the contract monthly after 
the settlement deadline." Therefore, each monthly extension payment extended the settlement 
deadline to the end of the following month. 
The Harrisons use the Tenth Circuit case Navair, Inc. v. /FR Americas, Inc. (utilizing 
Kansas law) to assert that the reasonable time requirement still applies even if the contract 
contains a specific date for performance that has been extended. 519F.3d1131, 1138 (10th Cir. 
2008). The Navair case is distinguishable from the present case. Navair involved a contractual 
dispute regarding the length of time an oral extension of the contract was valid for. The present 
case involves a contract which clearly states that extensions will be allowed and each extension 
will continue the contract monthly after the settlement deadline. Unlike Navair, there is no 
...tJ) ambiguity regarding the extension of the contract deadline so long as a valid tender of extension 
-8-
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payment was made. Because the contract specified a time for performance, the court cannot 
impose a reasonable time. 
The Harrisons contend that allowing NY A to continue making the extension payments 
indefinitely would lead to absurd results in that it would allow NYA to make interest-free 
payments for 40 years until the extension payments amounted to the purchase price. The 
Harrisons meanwhile would be forced to continue paying the carrying costs including property 
taxes. The Harrisons further argue that this could not have been the original intention of the 
parties because the parties did not execute the standard Seller Financing Addendum nor indicate 
anywhere in the REPC that they intended to create a seller-financed transaction. 
The Utah Supreme Court held in, Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larken-Gif.ford-Overton, LLC, that 
"[ w ]here the language within the four comers of the contract is unambiguous, the parties' 
intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract 
..J may be interpreted as a matter of law." 207 P.3d 1235, 1240 (Utah 2009). "Only if the language 
of the contract is ambiguous will we consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent." Id 
The evidence before the court shows that the parties agreed to the extension payment 
vu 
clause of the contract. Addendum # 1 of the REPC specifically states that NY A "may choose, at 
his sole discretion, to pay an additional amount of non-refundable earnest money to continue the 
..J contract monthly after the settlement deadline." It does not limit the number of times that the 
extension payments may be made, only that it is in NY A's sole discretion. The wording is clear 
-9-
and unambiguous; therefore, NY A was entitled to extend the settlement deadline so long as valid 
tender of the extension payment was made. 
NY A's statements in letters sent to the Harrisons regarding the time frame for settling 
constitute extrinsic evidence and cannot be considered by the court in determining if the contract 
contained a specific time for performance. 
2. Anticipatory Breach 
NY A claims that the Harrisons anticipatorily breached the contract by asserting that NY A 
was in default and demanding closing occur on August 5, 2009. As evidence of anticipatory 
breach, NY A points to comments made by Mr. Harrison to the effect that he wanted his $3 
million and that he was not willing to wait around anymore. On March 5, 2009, the Harrisons' 
attorney sent a letter to NY A stating that it had been 16 months since the original settlement 
deadline and that any reasonable time for closing had passed. NY A claims that this letter implied 
va that NY A was in breach of its performance under the REPC. The letter also stated that the 
Harrisons were willing to close on or before August 5, 2009, and that if NY A did not close by 
that date then the Harrisons reserved all their rights and remedies under the REPC. In addition, 
NY A points to the Harrisons' answers to the amended complaint in this action. Lastly, NY A 
points to the Harrisons' refusal to accept the August 31, 2009 Extension Payment as evidence of 
viJ anticipatory breach. 
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"An anticipatory breach of contract is one committed before the time has come when 
there is a present duty of performance, and is the outcome of words or acts evincing an intention 
to refuse performance in the future." Upland Industries Corp. v. P. Gamble Robinson Co., 684 
P.2d 638, 643 (Utah 1984). An anticipatory breach occurs only if a party to a contract "manifests 
a positive and unequivocal intent not to render its promised performance." Cobabe v. Stanger, 
844 P.2d 298,303 (Utah 1992). 
The Harrisons did not anticipatorily breach the contract. Although the Harrisons 
demanded that NY A close on or before August 5, 2009 and Mr. Harrison expressed his desire to 
either close or have NY A stop payments, these facts, especially viewed in a light most favorable 
to the Harri sons, do not "manifest a positive and unequivocal intent not to render [their] 
promised performance." Id The Harrisons' statements, the letter and the pleadings are better 
described as negotiation and litigation techniques, not a manifestation of their intention to refuse 
future perfonnance. 
3. The August 31, 2009 Extension Payment Constituted Valid Tender 
The letter accompanying the August 2009 Extension Payment lists the reasons why NY A 
originally intended to purchase the Property, namely, to develop for single-family residential 
homes; and the reasons why NY A has faced delays in readying the Property for development, 
namely, the sewer capabilities and storm drainage. Section (d) of the letter states: 
"The REPC could be extended, at my client's discretion as stated in the 
REPC, to allow for the property to be developed to its full potential. This 
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includes, but is not limited to: sewer line extension installed to the property, 
storm drainage readily available, and property being economically feasible to 
develop under zoning ordinances of Springville City and existing market 
conditions." 
The Harrisons claim that NY A breached the express terms of the REPC by making the 
August 2009 Extension Payment contingent on the Harrisons' acceptance of additional terms and 
failing to make any subsequent Extension Payments. 
"In order to be valid, tender of payment of money due must be ... unconditional." PDQ 
Lube Ctr., Inc. v. Huber 949 P.2d 792,800 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). "A tender, to be good, must be 
free from any condition which the tenderer does not have a right to insist upon." Sieverts v. 
White, 2 Utah 2d 351,273 P.2d 974 (Utah 1954). "The tender cannot impose on the other party a 
new condition or requirement not already imposed by the contract." Kelley v. Leucadia Financial 
Corp., 846 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1992). 
The August 2009 Extension Payment only contained conditions that NY A already had a 
right to insist upon based on the REPC, and therefore the extension payment was unconditional. 
The REPC does not explicitly state that closing would take place when it is economically feasible 
~ to develop, or based on the sewer line availability, storm drainage issues, or when the property 
could be developed to its maximum potential. The contract does, however, allow for extensions 
according to the Buyer's sole discretion. NYA's letter to the Harrisons noting its reasons for 
making the Extension Payments was a display of its discretion. The reasons for extending the 




add additional terms to the contract because according to the contract, NY A has the right to 
extend at its discretion. NY A's letter required the Harrisons to acknowledge rights that the 
contract had already granted to NY A; therefore, the August 2009 Extension Payment cannot be 
viewed as an invalid tender of payment. The Harrisons therefore breached the contract by 
refusing the valid tender. 
When the Harrisons refused the August extension payment they told NY A that they 
would accept the extension payments so long as they were not accompanied by additional 
conditions. They claim that because NY A failed to tender any other payments that NY A was in 
breach of the REPC. "[U]nder the 'first breach' rule 'a party first guilty of a substantial or 
material breach of contract cannot complain if the other party thereafter refuses to perform. He 
can neither insist on performance by the other party nor maintain an action against the other party 
for a subsequent failure to perform."' CCD, L.C. v. Millsap, 116 P.3d 366,373 (Utah 2005) 
(quoting Jackson v. Rich, 28 Utah 2d 134,499 P.2d 279,280 (1972)). 
Because the Harrisons refused the valid tender of the August 2009 Extension Payment, 
NYA's refusal to make any further extension payments is not a "failure to perform." The 
Harrisons were the first party to breach the contract and "cannot complain if the other party 
(NYA) thereafter refuses to perform." Id 
A final note as to the August tender: the court did not give credence to the language in the 
letter accompanying the August tender which stated "Nothing in this letter should be construed 
-13-
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as a demand by [NY A] for any rights or benefits other than those provided under the REPC." 
Although the court agrees with this statement, the court was not influenced by it. If the letter had 
in fact required the Harrisons to agree to additional terms, the statement would have carried no 
weight so the court analyzed the letter without regard to that statement. . 
.,.;; 4. Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
The Utah Supreme Court, in U.S. Fidelity v. US. Sports Specialty, defines the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing as "a duty not to intentionally or purposely do anything [that] will 
destroy or injure the other party's right to receive the fruits of the contract and to ... act 
consistently with the agreed common purpose and the justified expectations of the other party." 
US. Fid v. U.S. Sports Specialty, 270 P.3d 464,470 (Utah 2012). 
Utah looks to the justified expectations of the parties to determine breach of good faith 
and fair dealing. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194,200 (Utah 1991). 
This requires the court to look beyond the terms of the contract because an examination of 
contract terms alone is insufficient to determine the justified expectations of the parties. Id 
However, "[n]o such covenant may be invoked ... if it would create obligations inconsistent with 
express contractual terms." Young Living Essential Oils, LC v. Marin, 266 P.3d 814, ~ 10 (Utah 
2011 ). "While a covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in almost every contract, ... this 
covenant cannot be read to establish new, independent rights or duties to which the parties did 
not agree ex ante." Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 104 P.3d 1226, ~ 45 (Utah 2004). 
-14-
NY A has presented facts that it intended to extend the contract until it could develop the 
property and the Harrisons have brought forth facts that show they wanted a speedy closing. Thus 
there is a fact issue as to the parties' justified expectations. In addition, the Harrison's claim as to 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is denied because the contract granted NY A 
..&> the right to the extensions according to NYA's sole discretion and to find them in breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing would be inconsistent with the express terms of the 
contract and would be the enforcement of duties to which the parties did not initially agree to. 
5. Additional Earnest Money Deposits Apply to the Purchase Price 
NYA seeks a summary declaratory judgment that the Additional Earnest Money Deposits 
apply to the purchase price. Addendum #2 changed the amount of the monthly extension 
payment from $12,500 to $6,250; nothing in Addendum #2 changed the provision that the 
Additional Earnest Money Deposits were to be applied to the purchase price at closing. The 
Harrisons do not dispute this claim and state that they have never disputed this claim during the 
course of this litigation. NY A is therefore entitled to declaratory judgment that the Additional 
Earnest Money Deposits be applied to the purchase price. 
6. No Limitation on the Number of Extension Payments 
The REPC does not expressly limit the number of extension payments that the Buyer is 
entitled to so long as the $6,250 extension payment is timely made. "A contract should be 
reformed only when its terms are so vague that the intention of the parties cannot be ascertained 
-15-
therefrom." Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 511 P.2d 737, 739 (Utah 1973). Placing a limit 
on the number of extension payments allowed would be reforming the contract and thereby 
rewriting the parties' agreement. The contract in this case is clear, and NYA is entitled to 
declaratory judgment that the REPC does not limit the number of extensions to which Plaintiff is 
vi entitled when it timely pays the Extension Payments. 
7. Motion to Strike 
Defendants moved to strike portions of the Steven Kelly affidavit. While the motion was 
well-taken, the issue is ultimately moot because the court did not rely on paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 10 or 
13 of the affidavit in ruling on this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Utah in Carlson v. Hamilton said, "People should be entitled to 
contract on their own terms without the indulgence of paternalism by courts in the alleviation of 
one side or another from the effects of a bad bargain. Also, they should be permitted to enter into 
contracts that actually may be unreasonable or which may lead to hardship on one side." 332 
P.2d 989, 990-91 (Utah 1958); See also Johnston v. Austin, 748 P.2d 1084, 1089 (Utah 1988) 
(holding that courts should intervene and alter the contractual provisions only when the 
enforcement of the terms of the uniform real estate contract would be unconscionable). Though 
the Harrisons argue that allowing for indefinite extension payments would lead to absurd results, 
the courts may not step in to alleviate the effects of a bad bargain. 
-16-
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The contract in this case provides for a specific time of performance; therefore, this court 
cannot imply a reasonable time of performance. While the Harrisons' actions prior to August of 
2009 did not manifest anticipatory repudiation of the contract, the Harrisons refusal to accept the 
August 2009 Extension Payment was an actual breach of the contract. Since the Harrisons 
.;;; breached the contract first by refusing a valid tender, they cannot then claim a breach by NY A in 
failing to perform. Because the Harrisons breached, NY A is entitled to its contractual remedies. 
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is granted as to all claims except for the claim 
that the defendants breached the agreement anticipatorily, and Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment is denied. Additionally, Plaintiff's motion for partial declaratory summary judgment is 
granted in that the Additional Earnest Money Deposits apply to the purchase price and 
Defendants may not limit the number of extensions to which Plaintiff is entitled when it timely 
pays the Additional Earnest Money Deposits. Plaintiffs counsel will draft an order consistent 
with this ruling. 
Dated this 14th day of June 2012. 
-17-
BY THE COURT: 
Judge David N. Mortensen 
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DAVID D. HARRISON, an individual, and 
JAN C. HARRISON, an individual, 
Defendants and 
Counterclaimants. 
ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 090402295 
Judge: David N. Mortensen 
This matter having come before the Court for hearing on April 19, 2012 on Plaintifrs 
Motion for Summary Judgment and on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The parties 
were represented by counsel. The Court, having reviewed the pleadings, memoranda, affidavits 
and other evidence present and on file, having heard the parties arguments, and otherwise being 
051.0 
fully advised in the premises, issued its Ruling on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment. Based 
on the Court's Ruling on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment the Court now enters the 
following: 
ORDER 
1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
2. Plaintifrs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to NY A's Second Claim for 
Relief for Breach of REPC is granted, except for the claim of that Defendants anticipatorily 
breached the REPC, and Plaintiff is entitled to its contractual remedies. 
3. Plaintifrs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Plaintifrs Third Claim for 
Relief for Declaratory Judgment is granted and iti is hereby ordered that the Additional Earnest 
Money Deposits be applied to the purchase price under the REPC and that the REPC does not 
limit the number of extensions to which Plaintiff is entitled when it timely pays the Extension 
Payments .. 
4. Because the Harrisons breached, Plaintiff is entitled to its contractual remedies. 
However, the previous ruling of the court did not determine the amount of Plaintifr s damages. 
The issue o·f the amount of Plaintiffs damages, costs and attorneys fees is reserved at this time 
to be the subject of further motions or trial. 
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DAVID D. HARRISON, an individual, and 
JAN C. HARRISON, an individual, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER 
Date: July 5, 20 ~ :> 
Case No: 090402295 
Judge David N. Mortensen 
This matter is before the court on defendant's motion to reconsider this Court's earlier 
determination regarding cross-motions for summary judgment. This court received oral 
vJ arguments from the parties. At that hearing, New York A venue, LLC ("NY A") also made a 
motion for determination of damages, which motion was withdrawn. For the reasons which 
follow, this court denies the motion. 1 
Initially, the court should indicate that in its view the motion to reconsider should only 
consider new facts when a party claims that new evidence has arisen since the time of the court's 
I 
prior ruling. That is not the case here. Instead, the defendant's motion is quite clear that 
I 
1The Court acknowledges that it has taken some time for the court to issue this ruling. · 
However, given the parties great pains they have taken to provide the court with large body o( 
case law, the Court has taken the opportunity to read all of those cases individually, engage in 
independent research, and undergo a contemplative review of this matter. 1 
-1-
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defendants assert that the court made mistakes of law or mistakes of applying facts to law ~ch 
the court should reconsider. Particularly, defendants maintain that the court misconstrued the 
i 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and misapplied the tender statute. For these reasons, the 
Court is not considering any of the factual statements offered by any party in relation to this I 
motion. Instead, the court has reviewed this motion to reconsider only on its legal basis under 
the factual predicate of the motion already heard. 
Defendants make a number of assertions or pleadings which are inaccurate. Defendants 
maintain that the court ruled that the REPC term giving NY A discretion to extend the 
v) perfonnance date for the contract "precludes the application of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing." This was not the ruling of the court. Instead, the ruling of the court was that upder 
the particular circumstances of this case and the facts as presented to the court, defendants could 
not assert that plaintiff's reliance on an express term of the contract violated the covenant of i 
good faith and fair dealing. There would remain innumerable ways in which the parties could 
vJJ have violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the REPC's giving NYA discretion 
to extend the performance period might have nothing to do with such potential breaches of the 
covenant. 
Strangely, defendants fail to recognize that their argument is that unilaterally announjing 
that the performance period could not be extended, in direct contravention of the express 1 
~ contractual terms, would be not in keeping with the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. pie 
-2-
I I 
court's determination here, in keeping with Utah precedent, is that the covenant of good faith and 
I 
fair dealing did not apply because plaintiff was exercising an express condition of the contract. 
In the present case, the court in no wise ruled that NY A had unfettered discretion in 1 
I 
vP · extending the contract. The court only ruled that it was not a violation of the covenant good faith 
I 
and fair dealing to extend the contract in compliance with the express terms which provided, I 
first, a time certain for the extension, and secondly, a component of additional consideration for 
! 
the exercise of that discretion. This express provision of the contract is considered against th~ 
I 
background that the parties could have limited the number of times the contract could have b~en 
vJ extended or they could have provided for a back-end, or "drop dead," date by which NYA wduld 
have to perform. The parties chose not to include such a provision. 
As plaintiff correctly points out, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited:1 
First, this covenant cannot be read to establish new, independent rights or duties 
to which the parties did not agree ex ante. Second, this covenant cannot creat~ 
rights and duties inconsistent with the express contractual times. Third, this 
covenant cannot compel a contractual party to exercise a contractual right "to its 
own detriment for the purpose of benefitting another party to the contract." 1 
Finally, we will not use this covenant to achieve an outcome in harmony with the 
court's sense of justice but inconsistent with the express terms of the applicable 
contract. 
I 
Oakwood Village, LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ,r 45, 104 P.3d 1226 (quoting 
I 
Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., 889 P.2d 445, 447 n. 13 (Uta:h 





In the present case, the assertion of the covenant as defined by the defendants would 
~ 
establish new and independent rights or duties to which the parties did not agree in the form~tion 
I 
of the contract The assertion of the covenant as defined by the defendants would create rights 
1./fj and duties inconsistent with the express contractual terms. Using the covenant to overcome the 
I 
express terms of the contract would elevate the court's sense of justice above those express 
terms. This court declines to do so. 
Ultimately, this court concludes there is no violation of the covenant good faith and fair 
dealing here because "There is no violation of the duty of good faith, as a matter of law, whep a 
vJ party is simply exercising its contractual rights." PDQ Lube v. Huber, 949 P .2d 792, 798 (Utph 
App. 1997)( emphasis added). Here, the court concludes that NY A was simply exercising its , 
contractual rights and therefore the court concluded, as a matter of law, that no violation of the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing had occurred. This court concludes that reasonable minds I 
could not differ in concluding that NY A did not wrongfully exercised the express contractual 1 
va provisions here. 
The court has reviewed its decision regarding the tender in this case and does not believe 
that one party explaining to the other why it is taking certain actions in extending the contrac~ 
~ I 
again pursuant to the express terms of the contract, violates the tender statute. Under the 
I 
defendant's analysis had NY A simply sent a one line letter purporting to extend the contract with 
! 
a check, everything would have been fine. However, explaining their thinking as to why they. 
I 
-4-
\Id . . . 
I 
were electing to extend made the offer somehow conditional in the defendants' minds. The ~urt 
again disagrees. Instead, this court considered the context of the parties actions and specifically 
looked at whether the tender added new additional terms. This court concluded that the tender 
! 
..d) did not and therefore the tender was valid. 
Accordingly, the motion for reconsideration is denied. Plaintiff's counsel shall subm\t on 
order for the court's signature. 
Dated this 5th day of July 2013-
Judge David ~:-/ilJ'.' mr.linr4 
Fourth Judicial 
-5-
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NEW YORK A VE., LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company, 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim 
Defendant, 
vs. 
DAVID D. HARRISON, an individual, and 
JAN C. HARRISON, an individual, 
Defendants and 
Counterclaimants. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
Case No. 090402295 
Judge: David N. Mortensen 
This matter came before the court on Defendants' Motion to Reconsider its ruling on the 
Cross Motions for Summary Judgment filed by the Plaintiff and the Defendants. The court 
having reviewed the motions and memoranda filed by the parties, having heard the oral 
arguments of counsel, being fully advised in the premises and having entered its ruling now 
..dJ makes and enters the following: 
ORDER 
1. Defendants maintain that the court ruled that the REPC term giving NY A 
discretion to extend the performance date for the contract "precludes the application of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing." This was not the previous ruling of the court. Instead, 
the previous ruling of the court was that under the particular circumstances of this case and the 
facts as presented to the court, defendants could not assert that plaintiff's reliance on an express 
term of the contract violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court's 
determination here, in keeping with Utah precedent, is that the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing did not apply because plaintiff was exercising an express condition of the contract. 
2. In the present case, the court in no wise ruled that NY A had unfettered discretion 
in extending the contract. The court only ruled that it was not a violation of the covenant good 
faith and fair dealing to extend the contract in compliance with the express terms which 
provided, first, a time certain for the extension, and secondly, a component of additional 
consideration for the exercise of that discretion. This express provision of the contract is 
considered against the background that the parties could have limited the number of times the 
contract could have been extended or they could have provided for a back-end, or "drop dead," 
date by which NY A would have to perform. The parties chose not to include such a provision. 
3. In the present case, the assertion of the covenant as defined by the defendants 
would establish new and independent rights or duties to which the parties did not agree in the 
formation of the contract. The assertion of the covenant as defined by the defendants would 
create rights and duties inconsistent with the express contractual terms. Using the covenant to 
3 
overcome the express terms of the contract would elevate the court's sense of justice above those 
express terms. This court declines to do so. 
4. The court concludes there is no violation of the covenant good faith and fair 
dealing here because "There is no violation of the duty of good faith, as a matter oflaw, when a 
party is simply exercising its contractual rights." PDQ Lube v. Huber, 949 P .2d 792, 798 (Ut 
App. 1997) ( emphasis added). The court concludes that NY A was simply exercising its 
contractual rights. Therefore the court concluded, as a matter of law, that no violation of the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing had occurred. The court further concludes that reasonable 
minds could not differ in concluding that NY A did not wrongfully exercise the express 
contractual provisions. 
5. The court has reviewed its decision regarding the tender in this case and does not 
believe that one party explaining to the other why it is taking certain actions in extending the 
contract pursuant to the express terms of the contract, violates the tender statute. Under the 
defendants' analysis had NY A simply sent a one line letter purporting to extend the contract with 
a check, everything would have been fine. However, Plaintiffs explaining their thinking as to 
why they were electing to extend made the off er somehow conditional in the defendants' minds. 
The court again disagrees. 
6. The court considered the context of the parties actions and specifically looked at 
whether the Plaintiffs tender added new additional terms. The court concluded that the tender 
did not add new additional terms, and therefore the tender was valid. 











Dated this __ day of _____ __, 2013 
5 
BYTHECOURT 
Judge David N. Mortensen 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
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UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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Ruling on Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on Damages 
Date: May 30, 2014 
Case No. 090402295 
Judge David N. Mortensen 
Plaintiff has brought a motion for partial summary judgment on damages. Earlier, this 
court granted partial summary judgment as to liability. The present motion came before the court 
for oral argument on May 15, 2014. After interrogating1 counsel, the court indicated that it felt it 
could rule as a matter of law as to the issue of the "election of remedies" provision of the real 
estate purchase contract at issue. However, the court indicated that if plaintiffs were seeking 
anything other than damages based upon what monies had been paid to defendants as earnest 
1Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56( d) provides that a court may "interrogate" counsel to 
vJ9 ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and thereupon make a 
determination of which facts will be adjudicated trial. 
1 
0870 
money or otherwise, then factual issues precluded entry of summary judgment.2 Plaintiff's 
counsel requested, and was granted, leave to discuss with his clients whether to accept the 
amounts discussed by the court, or whether to proceed with trial. Tentative trial dates were set. 
In a follow-up telephone conference ofMay 20, 2014, plaintiff indicated that it did not 
wish to proceed to trial, that plaintiff would only seek those damages previously addressed in 
court, and that plaintiff would prepare a judgment after receipt of a memorandum of this Court's 
ruling outlining the court's views on the election of remedies issue and a determination of 
reasonable attorneys fees. Defendants agreed with striking the trial and moving forward as 
..;;; indicated with the entry of the judgment.3 The parties agreed that upon receipt of this court's 
ruling, plaintiff's counsel will prepare and submit a judgment and order reflecting the court's 
rulings, with leave to review the figure discussed in court for prejudgment interest, and submit 
those documents to the court. The court indicated that if a dispute arose as to the amount of 
prejudgment interest, plaintiff could insert their figure in their proposed judgment, defendants 
l.l!P could objects thereto, plaintiff could respond to the objection, and the court would resolve the 
issue based upon those memoranda. Accordingly, the court explains the legal position regarding 
a election of remedies and rules as to attorneys fees as follows. 
2S pecifically, this court indicated that it viewed the case as defendants did and that the 
only damages thus far proved on the record before the court were $147,503 in return of money 
deposited with the defendants, $79,089.30 in prejudgment interest, and reasonable attorneys fees. 
3Defendants expressly reserved their objection to, and their intent to appeal, any issues 
relating to liability. 
2 
Election of Remedies 
Plaintiff claims to be seeking damages under paragraph 18 of the real estate purchase 
contract in this case. That paragraph states in pertinent part: 
If Seller defaults, in addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, 
Buyer may elect either to accept from Seller a sum equal to the Earnest 
Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or may sue Seller to specifically 
enforce this contract or pursue other remedies available of law. If Buyer 
elects to except liquidated damages, Seller agrees to pay the liquidated 
damages to Buyer upon demand. 
( emphasis added). The facts are undisputed before this court, and plaintiW s counsel 
acknowledged at oral argument, that plaintiff has never fonnally elected which of the contractual 
remedies under paragraph 18 it is seeking. Specifically, plaintiff acknowledges that it has never, 
including up to the time of oral argument on the motion for partial summary judgment, made any 
-.a demand pursuant to paragraph 18 of the real estate purchase contract. 
This court ruled that by virtue of litigating the matter up to the threshold of trial that 
plaintiffs had elected their remedy contractually. This court found from the circumstances that 
the buyer had elected to "pursue other remedies available at law," specifically actual damages.4 
Plaintiff argues however that "election of remedies" is simply a procedural device to ensure that 
a party does not recover twice for the same damages. 
Plaintiff's position exhibits a fundamental misunderstanding between the procedural 
doctrine of election of remedies and a contractual provision for the election of remedies. Myriad 
4Plaintiff has never claimed it was seeking specific performance. 
3 
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cases show this distinction. Plaintiff cites the Utah Supreme Court case of Angelos v. First 
Interstate Bank Of Utah, 671 P.2d 772 (Utah 1983) which does explain the procedural doctrine. 
The doctrine of election of remedies is a technical rule of procedure and its 
purpose is not to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to prevent double 
·viP redress for a single wrong. Said doctrine presupposes a choice between 
inconsistent remedies, a knowledgeable selection of one thereof, free of 
fraud or imposition, and a resort to the chosen remedy evincing a purpose 
to forego all others. 
~ Id. at 778 (quoting Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibralter Financial Corp., 603 P.2d 793, 796 (Utah 
1979)). The application of the doctrine of election of remedies makes sense in the context of the 
Angelos case, where an orthodontist brought a claim against a bank for wrongful acceptance of 
checks with forged endorsements of the orthodontist's assistant. In Angelos the question was 
whether the orthodontist could obtain a judgment against both the bank and the assistant. Under 
~ the law, the Angelos court held that the orthodontist could proceed against both parties. 
Likewise, the doctrine of election of remedies would not allow a party in a contract action, for 
example, to recover both breach of contract and quasi-contract damages, since the theories are 
mutually exclusive. Still, modem pleading practice would allow alternative theories to be pied 
and even presented to the jury for a factual determination of which one applied. See Parrish v. 
~ Tahtaras, 1 Utah 2d 87,318 P.2d 642 (1957). In this way, a party will not be required to make 
an election of remedies as a procedural matter. 
A contractual provision for the election of remedies, on the other hand, is an entirely 
different matter. As far back as Varn Zyverden v. Farrar, 15 Utah 2d 367m 393 P.2d 468,470 
4 
(1964) the Utah Supreme Court held that a contractual provision giving a party several 
,.J 
alternative remedies "requires [the party] to make his election; and the [ other party] is entitled to 
notice that he has done so." In Adair v. Bracken, 145 P.2d 849 (Utah App. 1987), a case with 
vd> some similarities to the present case, the court held that a seller did not provide the buyer with 
adequate notice of default and notice of forfeiture as required by the contract, and this failure had 
a substantive effect. In the contractual context, action by a party can constitute a contractual 
:.d} 
election of remedies. This was the actual holding in McKeon v. Crump, 2002 UT App 258, 53 
P .3d 494; that is, an act - failure to return the earnest money before filing suit - constituted a 
...;; contractual election of remedies precluding other remedies under the contract. See accord 
Groberg v. Housing Opportunities, Inc., 2003 UT App 67, 68 P .3d IO 15 (renovators 
contractually elected remedy under purchase agreement and were precluded from maintaining an 
..a) 
action for breach of the same agreement): Commercial Invest. Corp., v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105, 
1109 n.7 (Utah App. 1997)(noting that a default notice did not give notice of an election of 
...a remedies, "a requirement of the contract terms."). 
~ 
Because this case involves a contractual provision for the election of remedies, and not 
the procedural doctrine of election of remedies, and because plaintiff admits it has not ever 
(including up to the present time) made a demand required by the contract in this case, by 
pursuing this lawsuit plaintiff has elected contractually the remedy of seeking actual damages and 
vJ not the "Earnest Money Deposit", however that term is interpreted, under paragraph 18 of the 
5 
contract. 
Attorney Fees. The Court has previously concluded that plaintiff is the prevailing party 
in this matter and has indicated that attorney's fees should be awarded. Plaintiff has presented 
vj their attorneys fees up to the time of the motion as part of this motion for summary judgment. 
'JI!) 
Defendant maintains that the amount of fees sought is unreasonable and that plaintiff is not 
entitled to certain attorneys fees or costs under the law. 
The court has carefully considered the arguments of the parties in connection with 
attorneys fees and most particularly the multiple affidavits filed by plaintiff's current and former 
·~ counsel. Upon review, as the court indicated at the hearing of this matter, the Court will not 
allow any of the costs claimed except for the filing fee of $360. The other costs are the normal 
expenses of litigation which should be subsumed in general attorneys fees, or they are otherwise 
..ii 
not costs which have typically been allowed by Utah courts, and there has been no showing here 
of extraordinary circumstances as to why they should be allowed in this case. 
Defendants have objected to the attorney's fees as being unreasonable and in one 
particular way this court agrees. Some entries on the billing statements indicate simply 
"research" with no indication as to the issues being researched. Under such circumstances, this 
vi} 
court is unable to determine whether the issue would require the hours of research is indicated. 
Plaintiff has indicated that disclosing such information would violate the work product privilege . 
...; To this point, the court would note that the case is essentially over and there seems little reason, 
6 
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if any, to withhold the information. More fundamentally, plaintiff's counsel is entitled to 
essentially keep secret the topics of this research. But at the same time, plaintiff cannot seek 
reimbursement for them when their subject matter is kept secret. The court has deducted from 
~ the attorney's fees all such entries. Finally, the court has considered the fact that a majority of 
fees incurred in the fall of 2013 are related to the present motion for partial summary judgment 
regarding damages. In the court's view, a significant part of the ultimate theory of the plaintiff 
did not prevail in this motion. And although, on balance in the case, plaintiff is the prevailing 
party, as plaintiff did not prevail substantially on this latest issue, the court has determined that 
..;;; the attorneys fees should be reduced by $4,700 as it relates to the motion on damages. 
Accordingly, the total fees awarded by this Court are $59,607.25. 
In arriving at this fee award the court is left with no doubt that the legal work was actually 
vJ 
performed. In fact, this court is been on the receiving end of the majority of the legal work. The 
legal work was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute this matter. This entire case has 
,..;, been prosecuted and brought to a resolution by way of motion practice. Thus, the work was 
reasonably necessary. The attorneys' billing rates are consistent with those customarily charged 
in this locality for similar services, and if anything, those rate are either at the average or below 
it. The court has also considered the fact that the motion practice in this case has been 
substantial and the legal issues presented somewhat complex. Therefore, the amounts incurred 




provision of the contract at issue is quite broad and includes expressly attorneys fees which may 
have been incurred prior to the commencement litigation, for which an affidavit has been filed, 
and to which no objection was lodged. 
Conclusion 
As indicated, plaintiff's counsel shall prepare and submit a judgment and order reflecting 
the court's rulings, with leave to review the figure discussed in court for prejudgment interest, 
and submit that docwnent to the court within 10 days. 
Dated May 30, 2014. 
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EXHIBIT 10 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NEW YORK A VE., LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim 
Defendant, 
DAVID D. HARRISON, an individual, and 
JAN C. HARRISON, an individual, 
Defendants and 
Counterclaimants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT ON 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR 
DAMAGES 
Case No. 090402295 
Judge: David N. Mortensen 
This matter came before the court on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment for 
Damages and Liquidated Damages on May 15, 2014. The court having reviewed the motion and 
memoranda filed herein, having heard the oral arguments of counsel, being fully advised in the 
premises and having entered its ruling which is adopted by reference, now makes and enters the 
following: 
ORDER 
1. Plaintiff seeks damages under Paragraph 16 of the Real Estate Purchase Contract 
which is at issue in this case and which provides in pertinent part: 
If Seller defaults, in addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may 
elect either to accept from Seller a sum equal to the Earnest Money Deposit as 
) 0924 
liquidated damages, or may sue Seller to specifically enforce this contract or 
pursue other remedies available at law. If Buyer elects to accept liquidated 
damages, Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon demand. 
2. The facts are undisputed before this court, and plaintiffs counsel acknowledged at oral 
argument, that plaintiff has never formally elected which of the contractual remedies under 
paragraph 16 it is seeking. Specifically, plaintiff acknowledges that it has never, including up to 
the time of oral argument on the motion for summary judgment for damages, made any demand 
pursuant to paragraph 16 of the real estate purchase contract. 
3. By virtue oflitigating the matter up to the threshold of trial the Plaintiff has elected its remedy 
contractually. The court finds from the circumstances that the Plaintiff, as buyer, had elected to 
"pursue other remedies available at law," specifically actual damages. 
4. Because this case involves a contractual provision for the election of remedies, and not the 
~ procedural doctrine of election of remedies, and because Plaintiff admits it has not ever (including 
up to the present time) made a demand required by the contract in this case, by pursuing this 
lawsuit Plaintiff has elected contractually the remedy of seeking actual damages and not a sum 
equal to the "Earnest Money Deposit", however that term is interpreted under Paragraph 16 of the 
real estate purchase contract, as liquidated damages. 
5. The court has concluded that the Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this matter and has indicated 
that attorney's fees should be awarded to Plaintiff. 
6. The court will not allow any of the costs claimed except for the filing fee of $360.00. The other 
costs submitted are the normal expenses of litigation, should be subsumed in general attorneys 
fees or are otherwise not costs that have typically been allowed by Utah courts, and are not 
"' 
~ 
awarded to Plaintiff. 
7. Some entries on the billing statements indicated simply "research" with no indication as to the 
issues being researched. Under such circumstances, the court is unable to determine whether the 
issues researched would require the hours of research indicated. Plaintiff has indicated that 
disclosing such information would violate the work product privilege. The court notes that the 
case is essentially over and there seems little reason, if any, to withhold the information. More 
fundamentally, Plaintiff's counsel is entitled to essentially keep secret the topics of this research. 
But at the same time, Plaintiff cannot seek reimbursement for them when their subject matter is 
kept secret. The court has deducted from attorneys fees all such entries. 
8. The court has considered the fact that a majority of fees incurred in the fall of 2013 are related 
to the present motion for partial summary judgment. In the courts' view, a significant part of the 
vo ultimate theory of the Plaintiff did not prevail in the motion for summary judgment for damages. 
Although, on balance in the case, plaintiff is the prevailing party, as plaintiff did not prevail 
substantially on this latest issue, the court has determined that the attorneys fees should be reduced 
by $4,700 as it relates to the motion on damages. 
9. In arriving at the attorney fee award, the court is left with no doubt that the legal work was 
actually performed. In fact, this court has been on the receiving end of the majority of the legal 
work. 
10. The legal work was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute this matter. This entire case 
has been prosecuted and brought to a resolution by way of motion practice. Thus, the work was 
reasonably necessary. 
n 0922 
11. The attorneys' billing rates are consistent with those customarily charged in this locality for 
similar services, and if anything, those rates are either at the average or below it. The court has 
also considered the fact that the motion practice in this case has been substantial and the legal 
issues presented somewhat complex. Therefore, the amounts incurred for briefing the court on 
these issues are reasonable. 
12. Lastly, the court notes that the attorneys fee provision of the contract at issue is quite broad 
and includes expressly attorneys fees which may have been incurred prior to the commencement 
of litigation, for which an affidavit has been filed, and to which no objection was lodged. 
13. The total attorneys fees awarded to Plaintiff by this court are the sum of $59,607.25. 
14. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff is awarded judgment against Defendants as follows: 
A. Damages of $147,503.00 
~ B. Interest at 10% per annum on the earnest money deposited with Defendants from August 31, 
2009, the date of breach to June 23, 2014 $71,003.50. Per diem interest is $40.41 
C. Attorneys fees $59,607.25 
~ 
D. Court Costs $360.00 
Total $278,473.75 
~ 15. After entry, such judgment shall bear interest as provided in U.C.A Section 15-l-4(3)(a). 
16. The attorneys fees and costs awarded as provided above shall be augmented by such 
reasonable attorneys fees and costs as shall be incurred by Plaintiff in the enforcement or 
collection of the said judgment, as the same shall be established by affidavit. 
THIS ORDER AND JUDGMENT EFFECTIVE WHEN SIGNED BY THE COURT ABOVE. 
EXHIBIT 11 
DAVID D. JEFFS, #1654 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
90 North 100 East/P.O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Phones (801) 373-8848 
Facsimile (801) 373-8878 
E-mail: ddjeffs@jeffslawoffice.com 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NEW YORK A VE., LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company, 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant, 
vs. 
DAVID D. HARRISON, an individual, and 
JAN C. HARRISON, an individual, 
Defendants and Counterclaimants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT ON 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT AS TO 
ATTORNEYS FEES OR TO AUGMENT 
ATTORNEYS FEES AWARD 
AND 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE 
REPLY MEMORANDUM 
Case No. 090402295 
Judge: David N. Mortensen 
This matter came before the court on Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Order ai.id Judgment 
as to Attorneys Fees or to Augment Attorneys Fee Award and upon Defendants' Motion to 
Strike Reply Memorandum. The court having reviewed the motions and memoranda filed 
herein, and being fully advised in the premises and having entered its ruling now makes and 




1. Defendants' Motion to Strike the Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in support of the 
Motion to Amend or Augment Attorneys Fees is granted. 
2. The Court determines that Rules 52 and 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
are the appropriate mechanism for the determination of the additional or augmented attorney's 
fees requested by Plaintiff. The court further determines that Plaintiffs request was clearly 
timely in that Plaintiff raised the issue both before and immediately after the Court entered the 
Order and Judgment on July 1, 2014 (hereafter referred to as the "Order and Judgment"). 
3. Although the damages awarded to Plaintiff were resolved by way of summary 
judgment, the factual issue as to the amount of the attorney's fees was determined under Rule 
73 and can be addressed at this point in the litigation. 
4. The Court determines that attorney's fees were incurred by Plaintiff in late 2013 and 
2014 which have not already been determined by the Court. Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's 
fees for the reasons previously articulated by the Court in the earlier rulings and the Order and 
Judgment. 
5. As before, the Court finds that the legal work was actually performed. The legal 
work was, in part, reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute this matter. The attorneys 
billing rates are consistent with those customarily charged in this locality for similar services. 
6. Of the $13,900.75 of additional attorneys fees claimed, a substantial portion of the 
fees claimed for June 16, 2014 are related to an application for fees brought through an 
2 
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objection to the Order and Judgment, which process the Court has determined to be misplaced. 
The fees for such date should be reduced by $618.75, or half the time billed for such date. 
7. Of the $13,900.75 additional attorneys fees, $10,521.00 were incurred on the same 
issues for which the Court had previously reduced Plaintiffs attorney's fees, namely liquidated 
damages, because Plaintiff did not prevail on a majority of the damages Plaintiff sought. The 
Court therefore concludes that such $10,521.00 of additional attorneys fees requested should 
..;, be reduced by 50% or $5,260.00. 
8. Reducing the $13,900.75 amount of attorney's fees sought by Plaintiff by $618.75 
and $5,260.00 leaves the sum of $8,022.00, which this Court awards to Plaintiff as additional 
or augmented attorneys fees. 
9. Accordingly the $59,607.25 total amount of attorney's fees awarded to Plaintiff in 
the Order and Judgment is amended or augmented to be the sum of $67,629.25, and the Order 
and Judgment is so amended. 
10. The $278,473.75 total amount of the judgment granted to Plaintiff as set forth in 
the Order and Judgment is similarly augmented by the additional $8,022.00 to be a total of 
$286,495.75, and the Order and Judgment is so amended. 
THIS ORDER AND JUDGMENT EFFECTIVE WHEN 
SIGNED BY THE COURT ABOVE. 
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